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CONSTITUTIONAL CASH: ARE BANKS GUILTY
OF RACIAL PROFILING IN IMPLEMENTING
THE UNITED STATES PATRIOT ACT?
Cheryl R. Lee*
History teaches us that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.1
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INTRODUCTION
If you are Black or Brown and living in America, you have probably
been stopped and questioned by the police at some moment in your life.
Since the passing of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (hereinafter the
USA Patriot Act), if you are Brown, Muslim, a foreign national of Middle
* Associate Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law; Northeast-
ern University, B.S. 1982; Duquesne University School of Law, J.D. 1985. The author
wishes to thank Professor Cliff Rectschaffen for his caring inspiration. Professor Lee also
wishes to thank and congratulate her multi-talented teaching and research assistant Quiana
Atkins-Canada, a 2005 L.L.M. Graduate in Intellectual Property at Golden Gate Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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Eastern descent, "look Muslim" or "of Middle Eastern ethnicity," that
questioning may happen in a bank.
Black people know if they try to hail a cab they may be assumed to
be a threat or to be unable to pay. Or, if African Americans include certain
upscale department stores in their shopping plans, they may be followed
because of the presumption they are going to steal. Additionally, by now
everyone in America knows that if you are Black and driving a luxury car
on any highway in this country, you should be prepared to be stopped and• 2
questioned.
For probably the first time in America, Blacks may not be the most
suspicious people of color, at least not when terrorism is basis for suspi-
cion. People of Middle Eastern descent are being arrested for minor visa
defects, defects mostly attributed to Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) administrative errors. Many of South Asian, Muslim, Arab, and
even African descent have been victims of widespread FBI detentions,
CIA and FBI interrogations, local police department roundups and unjus-
tified arrests. 3 Since 9/11, Brown people, those of, or "appearing to be" of,
Middle Eastern descent, know they may be assumed to be a threat in
public crowds; in airports; on aircrafts, trains, buses; at automobile check
points, and at national landmarks or urban buildings of significance. They
know if they are traveling outside American borders, upon return to this
country they will be presumed to be a threat of national significance.
Many understand that if they walk into a bank to transact business, they
are likely to be profiled, reported to the U.S. Treasury Department or
scrutinized because of the presumption that they are terrorists or con-
2. DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA
COLLECTION SYSTEMS, PROMISING PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf. (confirming that most Americans, regard-
less of race, believe that racial profiling is a pervasive social problem and disapprove of the
practice). Ramirez observes:
National surveys have confirmed that most Americans, regardless of race, be-
lieve that racial profiling is a significant social problem. According to a Gallup
Poll released on December 9, 1999, more than half of Americans polled be-
lieved that police actively engage in the practice of racial profiling and, more
significantly, 81 percent of them said they disapprove of the practice. In a na-
tional sample of adults, 59 percent said that racial profiling is widespread.
When the responses to the survey question were broken down by race, 56
percent of Whites and 77 percent of Blacks responded that racial profiling
was pervasive. Additionally, the Gallup survey asked respondents how often
they perceived having been stopped by the police based on their race alone.
Six percent ofWhites and 42 percent of Blacks responded that they had been
stopped by the police because of their race, and 72 percent of Black men be-
tween ages 18 and 34 believed they had been stopped because of their race.
3. Arnoldo Garcia, No Nation of Immigrants Would Treat Immigrants This Way, NErwORK
NEws (2002),available at www.nnirr.org/news/archived-netnews/nonation.htm (describing
the thousands of Arab, South Asian, Muslim, and Sikh immigrants illegally detained and made
to submit to "voluntary" questioning and interviews since September 11, 2001).
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nected to terrorist activity. At the very least, the response from bank per-
sonnel to their banking will be markedly different than that received prior
to 9/11.
Incidents of hate crimes against American Muslims increased by
121% in 2003. 4 Being Muslim or "looking" Muslim or Middle Eastern
can get your bank account closed, credit card cancelled, application or
transaction at the bank branch office rejected, money wires refused, and
business relationships may be scrutinized. All this can happen without
your name being on, or in any way connected with, the Treasury De-
partment's list of suspicious persons.' Does this sound like America during
the McCarthy era, or during the Civil Rights Movement? This is what
American citizens, Muslim, Middle Eastern or those who "look" Muslim
or Middle Eastern, are facing in 2006.
Of course, racial profiling6 is not new; it is embedded in the fabric of
America. Profiling was born in the days of slavery when a slave could be
killed unless they could produce on demand a "pass" when .on the road to
carry out master's business. Now, "[a]s it has done in the past, the FBI is
once again targeting ethnic, political, and religious minority communities
disproportionately ... with its surveillance and enforcement efforts .... a
'Special Registration' program now requires tens of thousands of Arab and
Muslim immigrants to submit to a call-in interview from which other
4. Abdus Sattar Ghazali, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Up 121 Percent, AM.
MUSLIM PERSP., May 4, 2004, available at http://www.amp.ghazali.net/htnl/hatecrimes_
report html.
5. Using FINCEN (The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network), banks check
names against several lists maintained by the Treasury Department, the State Department,
the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the United Nations, the
European Union, and entities in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. The
lists include 390,000 names from 239 countries. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work is the arm of the Treasury Department responsible for overseeing and implementing
policies to prevent and detect money laundering in general and money laundering specifi-
cally related to terrorism.
6. Racial Profiling Data Collection Resource Center at Northeastern University,
Background and Current Data Collection Efforts: History of Racial Profiling Controversy (Nov.
2000), available at http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/article:
[A] profile is a coherent set of facts-known conditions and observed behav-
ior-that indicate a particular individual may be engaged in criminal activity.
Profiling first became associated with a method of intercepting drug traffick-
ers during the 1970's. In 1985 Operation Pipeline instituted by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) was designed as an intelligence-based as-
sessment of the method by which drug networks transported bulk drugs to
the marketplace, but became by virtue of the training of state police to be
used as a drug courier profile on highways, a technique to target [B]lack and
Hispanic male drivers by stopping them for technical traffic violations as a
pretext for ascertaining whether they were carrying drugs.
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immigrants are exempted. 7 Generally, hate crimes motivated by race in
the past five years have increased. 8
As with lynching in the 1800s and 1900s, the Civil Rights Move-
ment, and the 1992 Rodney King beating, America continues this pattern
of profiling. While profiling has always been institutional and govern-
ment-sponsored, under the cover of "terrorism" it is now legitimately
used by many more, from anyone in the tiniest local police agency to the
National Security Service.
Government-condoned racial profiling increases the likelihood of pri-
vate acts of racial profiling. The Civil Rights Movement gained momentum
in response to police sanctioned segregation and profiling in America.
Take for example the following incidents:
1. In Corpus Christi, Texas, on July 14, 2004, George and
Samimah Aziz-Hodge woke up to the image of a cross
burned on the front lawn of their Country Club Estates
home.9
2. In February 2004,-Muhammad Siddiqui, a Houston
architect, husband to a busy physician and father of two
young children, was home with his children, and received
a visit from two FBI agent. He opened the door, and re-
sponded to their request to question him by saying, "I'd
be happy to talk with you, but I'd like to have my attor-
ney present." One of the agents told him he did not need
an attorney, that would only make him look guilty. The
agent insisted Siddiqui submit to the interview "now."10
7. See ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: THE FBI's POWER TO
RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITHOUT TELLING You 8,9.
(2003); Eric Lichtblau, FB.I Tells Offices to Count Local Muslims and Mosques, N.Y. TIMES,Jan.
28, 2003, at A13 (reporting an F.B.I. order to field offices to count the number of Muslims
and mosques in their districts in order to "establish a yardstick for the number of terrorism
investigations and intelligence warrants"). See also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST 9/11 AMERICA (2003).
8. F.B.I. REPORT, TERRORISM 2000/2001, available at www.fbi.gov/publications/
terror/terror2000_2001.pdf, EB.I. REPORT, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2003, available at
http://www.FBI.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (reporting that 8,715 criminal offenses were identified
as being motivated by hate, and that offenses based on race account for the highest
category of hate crimes at 52.5%); The Human Rights Campaign, Alarming Rates of Hate
Crimes Reported By FBI (2004), http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/News
_Releases/20042/AlarmingRates .of HateCrimes..Reported-byFBI.htm (explaining
that the reporting of these crimes is voluntary for local jurisdictions and hate crimes often
go unreported by victims due to fear and stigmatization);William B. Rubenstein, The Real
Story of US Hate Crime Statistics:An Empirical Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1213, 1229 (2004)
(stating that Blacks report two thirds of 4600 racial hate crimes reported a year).
9. Cross Burning Family Calls for National Investigation, THE SAN DIEGO VOICE AND
VIEWPOINT,July 29, 2004, at Al.
10. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 E3d. 450, 466 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that if a
person is designated as an enemy combatant, the executive administration obtains virtually
[VOL. 11:557
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Siddiqui again asked to have his attorney present. The
FBI agent responded angrily, prompting Siddiqui to call
his attorney immediately. The attorney advised the agents
that her client did not wish to speak with them at that
time, but they could call her office and make an ap-
pointment to speak with him. The FBI agent responded
by screaming at the attorney that Siddiqui did not have
the right to counsel, an absolute misrepresentation of the
law. The agent refused any further conversation with the
attorney, instead shouting at Siddiqui to "turn off that cell
phone!" One of the agents pulled back his coat to reveal
a gun, scaring Siddiqui, whose children were still present.
The incident ended when the agents realized they would
not prevail and left, only after threatening Siddiqui. The
next day, an FBI agent confirmed that Siddiqui was never
a criminal target."
3. In March 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission announced a $1.1 million settlement against
Stockton Steel of California for workplace discrimination
against Muslims. Four Pakistani machine operators had
alleged they were routinely given the worst jobs, ridi-
culed during their daily prayers, and called "camel
jockeys" and "ragheads." Similarly, in the fall of 2002,
EEOC reached a $35,000 settlement with a North Caro-
lina medical clinic that had ordered a Muslim nurse not
to wear her religious headscarf. In January 2005, another
EEOC suit was filed against Norwegian Hospital in Chi-
cago for firing Ms. Abdullah, an employee whose family
has lived in the U.S. for generations, for referring to
Ramadan as "Taliban" and telling Ms. Abdullah she
should leave the country if she did not like the way she
was being treated.1
2
Discrimination against Muslims is clear; however, Americans are un-
familiar with this discrimination in banks. After the Great Depression,
Americans in this country were re-taught to trust banks. Trusting banks is
bred into our children. Washington Mutual Bank branch offices across this
country conduct "school days" during which an officer of the bank
complete discretion over the length of detention and whether the detainee is entitled to
consult a lawyer); Steve Fainaru & Dan Eggen,Judge Grants "Combatant"Access to an Attor-
ney, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at Al.
11. AmERicAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SANCTIONED BIAS: RACIAL PROFILING SINCE
9/11 15 (2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/racial20profiling/20report.pdf
12. Marjorie Valbron, Career Journal: More Muslims Claim They Suffer Job Bias, WALL
ST.J.,Apr. 15, 2003, at B1.
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actually goes to the local elementary school to accept deposits from every
child who wants to open or grow his own account.' 3 Ordinarily, no
American today would think a bank would discriminate against individu-
als because of their surname or how they look. But current bank behavior
is demonstrative of something new.
President Clinton declared racial profiling a "morally indefensible,
deeply corrosive practice," and further stated that "racial profiling is in fact
the opposite of good police work, where actions are based on hard facts,
not stereotypes. It is wrong, it is destructive, and it must stop.' 4 Yet after
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in
Pennsylvania, law enforcement began to disregard the traditional need to
find probable cause before intruding into a citizen's personal affairs. In
their zest to flush out the funds of foreign nationals who financed terror-
ism-the magnitude of which this country had never before seen'-the
Fourth Amendment was trumped. The government's first response, in the
name of national security, was to invade the privacy of citizens by using
tools already in place. Racial profiling was immediately employed. Then,
government agencies found they needed more latitude to legitimize their
probes. Their answer? The USA Patriot Act. Patriot Act I is an attempt by
the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, the National Secu-
rity Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to build a master list
of "evil doers" and their possible activities. One goal? To try to determine
where terrorist cash may be located in this country at any given moment.
If an individual conforms to the bank policy's defined profile,
and attempts a perfectly legal monetary transaction-which has been
designated by the bank as high risk, or is perceived to be suspicious, or a
violation of any law or regulation-service will either be refused or a
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)'6  or Cash Transaction Report
13. Washington Mutual Bank, School Savings, http://www.wamu.com/
personalbanking/newaccountschoices.
14. U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General's Conference on Strengthening
Police-Community Relationships, Report on the Proceedings,June 9-10, 1999, at 22-23.
15. See PETER SIGGINS, MARKKULA CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHics, RACIAL
PROFILING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2002), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/
ethicalperspectives/profiling.html (explaining federal investigations of more than 5000
young Middle Eastern men from countries linked to terrorism which included contacting
administrators at more than two hundred colleges and universities to obtain information
about these young men).
16. 12 C.ER. 208.20 (c)(2)(1995) (Suspicious Activity Reports, previously called
Criminal Referral Forms). Hereinafter referred to in this article as "SARs," these forms
were created by the Bank Secrecy Act & Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act
and are used by banks to report any suspicious transaction that may suggest money laun-
dering, terrorist activity, or a customer that appears to be avoiding BSA reporting
requirements to avoid the filing of a SAR or CTR. According to the BSA, a SAR must be
filed if a bank has any reason to suspect that a transaction involves funds derived from
illegal activity or is intended to disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity; serves
no apparent business or lawful purpose; or is designed to evade BSA regulations; and if the
[VOL. 11:557
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(CTR) 7 (both created by the existing Bank Secrecy Act, also known as
the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act)' 8 will be generated
and sent to the government.
This Article begins by comparing the concerns of American racial
profiling to current terrorism concerns. Part II is an overview of the Bank
Secrecy Act and its role in privacy issues concerning bank customers (as
the predecessor to the USA Patriot Act). Here, the value of traditional
reporting devices, specifically CTRs and SARs used by banks to alert law
enforcement to possible terrorist activities, are discussed and evaluated.
The facts suggest these reports have been ineffective in identifying terror-
ists, and have not only greatly infringed upon First Amendment' 9 privacy
rights, but also diminished the Fourth Amendment0 protection against
warrant-less searches of American bank account holders. Although the
Supreme Court has previously ruled on the Constitutionality of these
issues, I suggest that they must now reexamine a decision which many
always felt was illogical, but has become increasingly so in today's fear-
driven environment. Part III explores the policies banks initiated to com-
ply with Patriot Act I, and the possibility that those policies have
contributed, to the racial profiling of certain individuals of, or mistaken
for, being of Middle Eastern descent. Part IV is an analysis of some of the
problems Patriot Act I created. Part V highlights the dangers of The Pro-
posed Domestic Security Enhancement Act, also known as Patriot Act I.
Part VI discusses the desperate need to pass the End Racial Profiling Act
(ERPA)2 and evaluates whether the changes in bank policy attributed to
Patriot Act I and proposed Patriot Act II are essential to the government's
ability to strengthen national security and root out terrorists in our midst,
even though they compromise the financial privacy Americans expect and
believe in. Finally, the Conclusion proposes several solutions to protect
American Constitutional liberties, obtain the intelligence necessary to
protect us from terrorism, while most importantly beginning the process
of repairing the psyche of America.
bank after examining the available facts knows of no reasonable explanation for the trans-
action, it must be reported).
17. 31 C.ER. 103.22(a)(1)(2005) (requiring all financial institutions to file Cash
Transaction Reports (CTRs) for each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency, payment
and/or transfer to or by any bank involving a currency transaction or combination of
transactions in the same business day involving more than $10,000 and the transportation
of currency over $10,000 either into or out of the country).
18. Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (2000); 31 U.S.C.
§§ 5311-5322 (2003).
19. See U.S. CONsT. amend. 1.
20. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV
21. End Racial Profiling Act, H.R. 3847, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2132, 108th Cong.
(2003).
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I.THE RACIAL PROFILING PROBLEM
"Amnesty International USA estimates that almost one in three
people in the United States- approximately 87 million individuals in a
total population of approximately 281 million- is at high risk of being
subjected to some form of racial profiling.
2 2
Admittedly, terrorism is an immeasurable threat to national security.
But the terrorist-driven legislative impingement on American civil rights
is of equal magnitude. Ethnic hatred, radical religious passion and nation-
alist zealousness, fused with terrorism, has caused centuries of human
agony. Many of the attacks attributed to terrorism, in the United States
and abroad, have been committed by people of Middle Eastern descent.
However, this should not lead government officials to automatically con-
clude that because one is, or "appears to be" of, Middle Eastern descent,
they are a security risk. This suspicion is especially troublesome when held
by bank officials, in light of the suspiciousness with which minorities al-
ready view banking institutions. Certain American ethnic groups have
spent decades trying to convince their Depression-era elderly, militant or
simply conspiracy-theory happy relatives to take their money out of the
jar buried in the backyard, or from under the mattress or in the sock
drawer, and entrust it to a bank. If you are Brown, the fear your account
may be in jeopardy touches you in each banking transaction or interac-
tion with bank personnel. Is that fear legitimate? Absolutely. Patriot Act I
puts banks in the business of practicing selective enforcement and racial
profiling with every transaction, every hour of every business day. Fear of
23terrorism does not justify such suspicion.
Maintaining that "the decisions regarding account closing are based
on account activity, not on factors such as ethnicity, race, religion and
country of origin" Fleet Boston Financial Corp closed 15 Muslim and
Arab accounts without explanation.2 4 Fleet has been a hotbed of suspicion
22. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, THREAT AND HUMILIATION, RACIAL PROFILING,
DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE HUMAN IMPACT OF
RACIAL PROFILING 2 (2005).
23. The government maintains master lists of foreign banks, specially designated
nationals and blocked persons, and suspected terrorists that banks use for guidance when
considering whether a transaction or an individual should be the subject of a CTR or
SAR. Current blocking profiles from the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign
Assets Control and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and U.S. Department of
Justice Criminal Division, include individuals and entities appearing on OFAC's Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons ("SDN") list: Cuban, North Korean, and Ira-
nian citizens, wherever located; individuals living in North Korea, Iran or Cuba, regardless
of citizenship; companies (including banks) located in North Korea, Cuba, areas of Bosnia
and Herzegovina controlled by Bosnian Serb forces; those engaging in certain transactions
with Angola; and governmental entities and officials of Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.
24. Matthew Brelis, Muslim Society Presses Fleet Challenges Decision to Shut 15 Accounts
with Arabic Names, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.4, 2003, at D1.
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in the area of discrimination, paying more than $100 million in Georgia
in 1996 to settle class actions over discrimination. In 1995, the Justice De-
partment investigated the'bank for allegedly charging minority home loan
borrowers higher fees.25
A Denver attorney, Qusair Mohamedbhai, filed a federal lawsuit in
March 2005. A member of both the Colorado and Wyoming state bars,
and in good standing with excellent credit, he alleged that he was denied
a checking account by Commercial Federal Bank in May 2004 and that
the bank racially profiled and slandered him. Mohamedbhai was appar-
ently under the initial impression his denial was routine, until he learned
that Genevieve Babcock-Elder of Colorado Cheque Connection had
actually spelled out his name to a seminar audience on banking and ter-
rorism during which she publicly claimed credit for "thwarting a terrorist
from getting a checking account." Mohamedbhai, who was born in Ed-
monton, Alberta and "looks Middle Eastern," but is of Indian descent and
is a permanent legal resident of the United States, was characterized by
Babcock-Elder as having "moved around a lot," "funneled $160,000 for
terrorism eight years earlier through the Colorado National Bank and had
returned to the scene of the crime:' Babcock-Elder also loosely associated
Mohamedbhai to the terrorists who expedited 9/11 by suggesting that
because his Social Security card was originally issued in Florida, where
the terrorists took flying lessons, he was connected to the group. 6 In fact,
Mohamedbhai had no involvement in any of the suggested activities.
While large banks like Fleet have to balance the requirement to file
SARs and CTRs based on suspected suspicious activity, their responsibil-
ity to protect the privacy and rights of their account holders still remains.
When a customer's name is NOT on a federal list, the bank ultimately has
the discretion whether to file a SAR, or CTR. Often, it is because of this
discretion that discrimination occurs.
FBI Special Agent Colleen Rowley observed in her questioning in
terrorism investigations, "[t]he vast majority of the one thousand plus per-
sons 'detained' in the wake of 9/11 did not turn out to be terrorists ...
[she admits] the balance between individuals civil liberties and the need
for effective investigation is hard to maintain even during so-called nor-
mal times, let alone times of increased terrorist threat or war. It is,
admittedly, a difficult balancing act. But from what I have observed, par-
ticular vigilance may be required to head off undue pressure to detain or
'round up' suspects, particularly those of Arabic origin., 27
25. Id.
26. Man Denied Account Sues Bank, Alleges Racism, www.thedenverchannel.com/
print/431 3737/detail.htnl.
27. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, How "PATRIOT ACT 2" WOULD FURTHER
ERODE THE BASIC CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT POWER THAT KEEP AMERICA SAFE AND FREE
(2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12161&c=206
(citing to Full Text of FBI Agent's Letter to Director Mueller, N.YTlMES, Mar. 5, 2003).
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In the three years since Patriot Act I was passed, racial profiling
based on assumptions about national origin have re-emerged as acceptable
law enforcement and societal behavior. Particularly those of Arab and
Muslim descent, or those who appear to be of Middle Eastern origin, have
noted increased incidents of disparate treatment as a result of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11.8 While profiling may seem reasonable in today's anti-
terrorism environment, this practice is not acceptable under the constitu-
tional protections of a free nation. While building the ideology of the
USA Patriot Act, our legislators ignored the racial and privacy implica-
tions of Patriot Act I. They are considering compounding that mistake in
Patriot Act II. Perhaps the most overwhelming constitutional dangers
were created by the regulatory responses of banks to Patriot Act I.
Policies adopted by banks in response to the demands of the Bank
Secrecy Act, the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act,29 Patriot
Act I and the Proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act referred to
as Patriot Act II 30 promote institutional racism. Now, not only must peo-
ple of color still submit to unequal and unconstitutional treatment by law
enforcement on the street, but denial of privacy at the teller window is
further eroding their constitutional rights. Because of this potential harm,
banks, at a minimum, should be required to find some level of probable
cause before filing a SAR or CTR, or subjecting an account holder and
their banking activities to government intrusion. The Right to Financial
Privacy Act (herein RFPA)31 generally prohibits disclosure of a customer's
banking records to the government without the customer's consent.
However, the Bank Secrecy Act has a markedly different threshold, and
states that there is no right to privacy in an individual's bank records. The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in bank records.32 Under Patriot Act I, banks are forbidden from
disclosing their CTR and SAR reporting activities to their account hold-
ers. It is the numerous exceptions created by this maze of legislation that
allows unprecedented exposure of individual financial privacy.
How should we balance the government's need to maintain a safe
country with our citizens' rights to privacy? Should we engage in a cost
28. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION TO
PROVIDE LEGAL HELP TO MUSLIMS AND ARABs CAUGHT UP IN NEW ROUND OF FBI
QUESTIONING (2004), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/18508prs2004O8O5.html.
(announced in response to a recent announcement by Attorney General John Ashcroft and
FBI Director Robert Mueller that the FBI would launch a new round of dragnet-like
interviews in Arab and Muslim communities nationwide).
29. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, 102 Pub. L. No 550, § 106 Stat.
4044 (1992) (codified in several sections of 12,18, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
30. See Interested Persons Memo: Section-by-Section Analysis of Justice Department draft
"Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003," also known as PATRIOT Act 11 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/172031eg20030214.html.
31. The Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. % 3401-342.
32. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,443 (1976).
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effective analysis to determine if profiling is justified? How should one
measure the injury to someone who is mistaken for a terrorist resulting in
their bank account being frozen , or has a SAR, or CTR mistakenly filed?
It is logical that if law enforcement is looking for Middle Eastern terror-
ists they will certainly heighten their scrutiny of people from the Arab
world. However, the racial profiling of Blacks has not served to curtail
drug trafficking in this country.33 In practice, how does a teller,34 an opera-
tions manager or a bank branch manager draw a conclusion as to whether
to approve a $10,000 transaction for an individual and/or file a corre-
sponding SAR or CTR? By a glance, a twenty second conversation, or an
evaluation of an individual's clothes, demeanor, race or ethnicity, or a cur-
sory review of the transaction itself? This process of practical application
of the BSA is what can create misjudgments.
Bank reporting policies are dangerous not because the policies are
wrong, but because these policies do not, or perhaps cannot, factor in the
decision making ability and biases. New tellers and seasoned tellers alike
are trained in these policies, but both still have little experience applying
them.
The "little people" like bank tellers and TSA (Transportation Secu-
rity Administration) screeners are on the front lines of terrorist inspection
in this country. Consider the operations manager who harbors secret bi-
ases against those of Middle Eastern descent. What about the teller who
simply does not understand the threshold of cash or criteria for reporting
a "suspicious act?" Or perhaps these incidents happen maliciously, because
33. See Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War
on Drugs (2000) and Human Rights Watch,Justice on Trial: Racial Disparities in the American
Criminal Justice System (2002) (on file with author); Ronald H.Welch & Carlos T. Angulo,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Leadership Conference Education Fund, April
2000 7(on file with author)(explaining that most drug users are not Black, but Blacks
represent 13% of drug users nationwide, in proportion to their share of the population,
and that escalating pressure from the war on drugs has led some police officers to target
people of color whom police believe to be disproportionately involved in drug use and
trafficking). John Lamberth, Report of John Lamberth, Ph.D., available at http://
www.stat.uiowa.edu/-gwoodwor/statsoc/lectures/w2/lamberth.html (finding that on I-
95 in Maryland, 28.4% of Black drivers and passengers who were searched were found
with contraband and 28.8% of White drivers and passengers who were searched were
found with contrabandI-thus the probabhity of finding contraband was the sae fobr
Blacks and Whites); STATE OF NEW JERSEY, SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS OF THE INTERIM REPORT
OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM R EGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (1999),
available at http://www.aele.org/NJprofil.htm (stating that the "hit rates" at which contra-
band was found among those searched did not differ significantly by race ... to date the
evidence indicates that Blacks and Latinos are no more likely than Whites to be in posses-
sion of narcotics or other contraband); RAmImEz, supra note 2, at 10 (indicating that Blacks
and Latinos are no more likely than Whites to be in possession of narcotics or other con-
traband).
34. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control considers
tellers to be a bank's "first line of defense against violative personal remittances." 1378
PLI/Corp 627,652 (July 2003).
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the bank teller or TSA screener's duties are their first or only exposure to
power over others. Regardless, because of civil and criminal penalties
which can be levied if mistakes are made, these individuals are going to
err on the side of caution.A bank can be fined up to $1 million if they do
not act decisively to stop an illegal flow of money or freeze an account.
That translates into real pressure for an employee at the teller window or
on the floor of the bank branch office.
Those who work in the front lines of carrying out bank policy are
members of a society in which insidious racism thrives. They are, like all
of us, operating with the same standards of behavior that exist in the lar-
ger society. For years, local and national leaders claimed there was no
evidence of selective enforcement of the law, no evidence that Blacks
were being profiled and stopped in their automobiles for imaginary viola-
tions of the law. Even when irreffitable proof was presented to the
contrary, there was no response. America did not care for a very long time.
To the great surprise of some, in 1989 the incidents of racial profiling on
New Jersey highways became national news. In some circles the existing
evidence was debated, but disregarded, partially because it was people of
color who were affected.
Should we care now? As vehemently as we may deny the continued
existence of institutional racism, there is substantial evidence it remains.
Profiling exemplifies the Constitutional dangers when laws are applied
unequally to different ethnic groups. Legitimizing racial profiling in a
world where we all, including bank officers and employees, use discretion
tainted by personal prejudices, gives the government the power to label
people of color as "suspicious." Patriot Act I is the first born child of The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 3' FISA arose from J. Edgar Hoover's
obsession with Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders. Pa-
triot Act I allows every law enforcement official-from the CIA to the
local sheriff-the right to rely on these broader domestic surveillance
rules36 to root out terrorists, resulting in the harassment of, and harm to,
people of color. Giving local drug enforcement policemen broader pow-
ers is in part what led to the killing of Amadou Diallo.i Local police
flexing their discretionary powers is what led to the unabashed arrogance
it took for the attempted murder by sodomy of Abner Louima.38 When
the Judiciary, our legislators, and the people of this country accepted racial
profiling as a lawful tool to fight the drug war, they acquiesced in its law-
fulness to fight terrorism.
However, could class be more of the issue? Until very recently pri-
vate banking was a loophole in the broad swath of protection BSA
35. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (1978).
36. USA Patriot Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(2001)
37. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Death of Diallo, 688 N.YS.2d. 386 (N.Y
Sup. Ct. 1999).
38. Louima v. City of NewYork, 2004WL 2212093 (E.D.N.Y 2004).
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intended to create. Publicly, the wealthy are not thought of as having any
connection to terrorism, but the facts suggest otherwise. Government
intelligence agencies allege wealthy U.S. citizens have been used by terror-
ists to launder money. The Sami Amin AI-Arian scheme aside,39 wealthy
bank customers whose accounts regularly reflect large cash deposits and
withdrawals of the threshold CTR and SAR reporting amounts, carry out
their business freely without breach of their privacy or judgments regard-
ing the objective of their bank transactions. Even with new scrutiny,
private banking transactions rarely produce the filing of a SAR or CTR,
irrespective of the account holders ethnic origin. Most often, "Know-
Your-Customer ' 40 policies provide methods to obviate the banks of hav-
ing to file SARs or CTRs for these customers, 4' and therefore, powerful
or wealthy bank consumers are not often faced with this particular possi-
ble loss of their constitutional privacy rights.42
Unfortunately, in the process, basic Constitutional costs are being
paid by all Americans as a result of the practical problems created when
banks use racial profiling in a hapless attempt to thwart terrorism.
II. COMPROMISING THE REPORTING DEVICES
A. Generating Cash Transaction Reports-CTRs
Patriot Act I requires the filing of a CTR to FinCen 43 by financial
institutions and by any person engaged in a (non-financial) trade or busi-
ness if they receive more than $10,000 in any currency in one transaction
or multiple related transactions totaling more than $10,000 during one
business day. The CTR is required by law to contain the name of the de-
positor, beneficial owner of the account if different than the depositor,
and address and telephone number of the depositor. CTRs were a tool
initiated in 1970 by the Bank Secrecy Act, but now closely associated
with both anti-money laundering as well as terrorism. The Department of
39. See Edmund L.Andrews, US. and Saudis Act to Freeze Charity's Assets, N.Y TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2004, at A4; Glenn R. Simpson, US. Links Scholar to Possible Terror Funding, WAIL
ST.J., Mar. 17, 2003,A4; United States v.Al-Arian, 267 F Supp. 2d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
40. Pursuant to BSA and § 326 of the Patriot Act, the Secretary of the Treasury
issues specific minimum "Know Your Customer" standards, requiring banks to attempt to
make reasonable and practical efforts at verification of new customers; maintain records of
the information used to verify identification; and consult lists of known terrorists. Online
brokers who do not meet or speak with their clients are required to use a computer sys-
tem which flags suspicious activity and to acquire customer information by other means,
such as through electronic databases like the credit reporting agencies.
41. See DEP'T OF TREASURY FORM TD F 90-22.53, available at www.fincen.gov.
42. But see U.S.A. Patriot Act, % 312(a)(3)(B), 363 (2003).
43. FINANcIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP'T OF THE TREAsuRy, I.R.S.
FORM 8300 (2004), http://www.fincen.gov/forms/fin8300_cashoverl0k.pdf.
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Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) tends to use CTRs
differently than SARs are used pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act.
"OFAC programs have historically emphasized 'freezing' rather
than 'seizing' assets to achieve foreign policy goals. Blocking
provisions are often 'protective" [or political] as when Kuwaiti
assets were preserved from Iraqi aggression or Norwegian and
Danish assets were shielded from the Nazi invasion of those
countries. Freezing is also used to create and preserve a "pool"
of assets to satisfy the interests of injured claimants and credi-
tors against parties under sanctions.",
44
The filing requirements for CTRs are fairly consistent and straight-
forward, but the boundaries of what constitutes "suspicious" activity and
therefore requires the filing of a SAR continue to be highly subjective
and capricious.
A CTR for each transaction (deposit, withdrawal, exchange of cur-
rency, or any other payment or transfer made to or through any financial
institution) involving more than $10,000 in currency must be filed by the
financial institution with the Treasury Department Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network (FinCEN) and are also often filed with the Internal
Revenue Service. The CTR must contain the name of the depositor,
beneficial owner of the account if different than the depositor, and address
and telephone number of the depositor.
Patriot Act I also greatly expanded the definition of "financial insti-
tutions" to include credit unions, casinos, money service businesses,
money transmitting businesses, securities brokers-dealers, futures commis-
sion merchants, commodity trading advisors, commodity brokers, and
commodity pool operators registered under the Commodity Exchange
Act.4 - All of these financial institutions must now file CTRs. Certain
other businesses are considered financial institutions under 31 U.S.C.
5312: pawnbrokers, travel agencies, insurance companies, dealers in pre-
cious metals, stones or jewels, telegraph companies, loan and finance
companies, persons involved in real estate closings and settlements, auto,
airplane and boat dealers. Partly as a result of expanding the definition of
a "financial institution," and for a multitude of other reasons, approxi-
mately thirteen million CTRs are filed each year, while bankers complain
that they are "virtually useless.' 46 Financial institutions have specific guide-
lines via the Treasury Department as to when they are required to file
CTRs. These banks may, however, exempt certain customers from CTR
reporting requirements.
44. 1378 PLI/Corp 627,653 (July 2003).
45. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
46. Krysten Crawford, Drawing a Bead on Terrorism Funds: Financial Fight May Be
Mission Impossible, LEGAL TIMES,Jan 28, 2002, at 1.
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Title III of Patriot Act I is titled "The International Money Laun-
dering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 ' '17 and
provides the authority for the filing of both CTRs and SARs. 48 Funds
which are the subject of a CTR are forfeited as part of any sentence for
criminal or civil49 violations of currency reporting rules.
B. Creating Suspicious Activity Reports-SARs
If in an individual transaction a bank receives $5,000 in currency, a
SAR is required to be filed. The reporting threshold for transactions con-
ducted at points of sale for money services businessess° is $2,000.1 The
SAR is forwarded to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the IRS, Fin-
CEN, and any other governmental agency that requests the SAR based• 52
on a need related to a terrorist investigative issue. Terrorist Financing was
added as a suspicious activity characterization in July 2003; between July
and December [2003], 495 SARs were filed with this characterization
box marked. 3
"A SAR must be filed with the Department of the Treasury under
the following circumstances:
Insider abuse involving any dollar amount that the financial in-
stitution detects or any known or suspected federal criminal
violation, committed or attempted against the institution when
the suspect is a director, officer, employee, agent, or other insti-
tution-affiliated party.
Violations aggregating $5,000 or more in funds or other assets
where a suspect can be identified.
47. U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50
U.S.C.).
48. These reports are submitted through a secure network managed by the financial
crimes communication center and the government-wide data access service, who catalog
information for purposes of rapid retrieval and prompt initial review of all suspicious ac-
tivity reports.
49. 18 U.S.C. 55 981-82 (2006).
50. 31 C.ER. § 103-15 (2006)
51. 31 C.ER. § 103-20 (2006).
52. FinCEN has implemented an optional system to promote the sharing of infor-
mation among financial institutions. Patriot Act Communications (PACS) allows banks to
expeditiously file BSA reports over the internet using a secure connection. It is hoped that
PACS will streamline the process, reduce the reporting costs for banks and other financial
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Violations aggregating $25,000 or more in funds or other as-
sets even though there is no substantial basis for identifying a
possible suspect or group of suspects.
5 4
There are currently twenty-two categories under which SARs
can be filed.""s
In general, a SAR should indicate five basic elements of informa-
tion: "Who is conducting the suspicious activity? What instruments or
mechanisms were used to facilitate the suspicious transaction(s)? When
did the suspicious activity take place? Where did the suspicious activity
take place? Why does the SAR filer think the activity is suspicious?"5 s
As with CTRs, Title III of Patriot Act I significantly increases the
number and types of financial institutions that are required to file SARs.
Securities broker-dealers, money transmitting businesses, and commodities
brokers registered with the SEC must now submit SARs. So, too, must
futures commission merchants, commodity trading advisors, and com-
modity pool operators registered under the Commodity Exchange 
Act.5 7
FinCEN publishes a national bulletin advising financial institutions
on trends and patterns in money laundering, and supplies examples of
suspicious transactions that could "highlight activities or issues that appear
significant based on such factors as number of reports, number of financial
institutions filing similar reports, aggregate dollar values, geographic dis-
tribution, and especially recurrent patterns of activity identified in SAR
narratives " ' 8 SAR Information Bulletins are designed to alert financial
institutions of the type of criminal activities that have been and should be
reported using SARs. The actual SAR form provides an opportunity to
report twenty different types of suspicious activities.8 While reporting the
vast majority of these "suspicious transactions" is of significant value, some
generalizations drawn from common reported transactions present poten-
54. Transactions aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential money launder-
ing or violations of the BSA, or where the transaction has no business or apparent lawful
purpose or is not the sort of transaction in which the particular customer would normally
be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no reasonable explanation for the transac-
tion after examining the available facts.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id.
57. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).
58. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep't of the Treasury, SAR Bulletin:
Information Drawn From the Suspicious Activity System 5 (2002), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/sarbul0201-f.pdf [hereinafter SAR Bulletin].
59. A financial institution can check boxes which indicate structuring/money laun-
dering, bribery/gratuity, check fraud, check kiting, commercial loan fraud, computer
intrusion, consumer loan fraud, counterfeit check, counterfeit credit/debit card, counter-
feit instrument, credit card fraud, debit card fraud, defalcation/embezzlement, false
statement, misuse of position or self dealing, mortgage loan fraud, mysterious disappear-
ance, wire transfer fraud, terrorist financing, and identity theft.
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tial dangers. Take, for example, Case 5 presented as a classic situation mer-
iting scrutiny. The example describes a "pattern of cash deposits below the
CTR reporting threshold generated a SAR filing by a U.S. depository
institution. Deposits were made to a foreign currency exchange on a daily
basis totaling $341,421 over approximately a two and one-half month
period. During the same period, the business initiated ten wire transfers
totaling $2.7 million that were sent to a bank in the United Arab Emir-
ates. When questioned, the business owner reportedly indicated he was in
the business of buying and selling foreign currencies in Iran, the Persian
Gulf states, and other countries in the Middle East, and his business never
generated in excess of $10,000 a day. CTRs for a three year period re-
flected cash deposits totaling $137,470 and withdrawals totaling $29,387.
The business owner and the cash out transactions were conducted of na-
tionals of countries associated with terrorist activity. Another U.S.
institution filed a SAR on this individual indicating an $80,000 cash de-
posit, which was deemed usual for his profession. He also cashed two
negotiable instruments at the same depository institution for $68,000 and
$16,387 according to CTR filings., 60 These transactions are indeed an
issue. But it is mainly the high deposits over the two month period and
the wires between the U.S. and the United Arab Emirates of $2.7 million
that should raise ire. The "pattern of cash deposits below the CTR report-
ing threshold" and cashing a $68,000 and $16,387 instrument could apply
to anyone conducting a personal or business transaction.
The indicators leading to the filing of a SAR cited in this bulletin
are entirely relevant and directive:
" Use of a business account that would normally not gen-
erate the volume of wire transfer activity, into and out of
the account, as reported;
" Apparent structured, daily deposits to business account;
" Wire transfer activity within a short period following de-
posits;
" Beneficiary account in a "problematic" country;
* Currency exchange buying and selling foreign currencies
from various countries in the Middle East;1
However, several additional indicators cited may suggest racial pro-
62
filing or create, at a minimum, a propensity to over-report. At the very
60. SAR Bulletin, supra note 58, at 4.
61. Id. at 4-5.
62. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep't of the Treasury, Industry Partner-
ship Results in Valuable Investigative Leads, FINCENNEws, Dec. 17, 2003, available at http://
www.fincen.gov/314arelease_121703.pdf (claiming to have processed 188 requests
submitted by ten federal agencies in response to financial institution searches on recent
account and transaction records about individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in,
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least, these indicators suggest that more definitive guidelines for a SAR
filing need to be established. Following are the additional pertinent direc-
tives cited as "indicators leading to the filing of a SAR:"
Transactions at a level not commensurate with stated oc-
cupations.
Business account activity conducted by nationals of
countries associated with terrorist activity with no obvi-
ous connection to the business;
* Apparent structured, daily deposits to business account;
* Wire transfer activity within a short period following de-
posits;
Apparent intent to circumvent wire remittance com-
pany's internal requirements for presentation of
identification through purchase of money orders in small
amounts;
Movement of funds through a Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) designated non-cooperative country or
territory such as the Cook Islands, Dominica, Egypt,
Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Lebanon,
Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Niue, Philippines,
Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines, and Ukraine.
* Use of sequentially numbered money orders;
* Funds generated by a business owned by nationals of
countries associated with terrorists activity
Use of a business account to make payments to a broker-
age firm;
Same day transactions at the same depository institution
using different tellers;63 and so forth.
These kinds of disputable guidelines further complicate the discretionary
decisions of front line bank employees because they are so open to inter-
pretation.
Bankers dislike SAR filings because the government's indicators are
inconsistently applied from bank to bank, and from market to market,
making it difficult for bank personnel to determine when a SAR needs to
be filed. After legions of hearings, directives, discussions and interpreta-
tions of BSA and Patriot Act I regulations, banks are still unsure and
or reasonably suspected of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering activities and to
have discovered numerous suspect accounts despite no clearly documented arrests stem-
ming from a particular SAR or CTR during that time period).
63. SAR Bulletin, supra note 58, at 2-5.
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anxious about the compliance advice they receive. In addition, banks
complain that different branches of the government are reviewing SARs
for different reasons, thereby making inconsistent demands about what
data should be supplied. SARs are often inaccurate and incomplete, mak-
ing them inappropriate for FinCEN to act upon. 64 Even the Office of the
Comptroller's 1700 examiners, with currently about 1800 OCC examin-
ers, are inconsistent in their evaluation of Bank compliance. In addition,
banks have become wary of complying with the government's regulations
due to the lack of confidentiality surrounding the filing of SARs. Leaks of
SARs from several banks have been documented,6 increasing the
64. See James F Sloan, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Fin CEN: Reliability of Suspicious Activity
Reports (Dec 18, 2002), www.ustreas.gov/inspector-general/audit reports/2003/
oig3035.pdf (reporting that many of the 505,000 SARs completed by financial institution
personnel and filed between April 1996 and December 2000 were either duplicated or
were inaccurate or incomplete. Information omitted from the forms included names of
the suspects, identification of what the suspected defense was, and the filing institution's
regulators); U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCENAwards
BSA Direct Contract to EDS, FINCENrEws, (June 30, 2004), http://www.fincen.gov/
bsadirectcontractaward.pdf (announcing a database of national bank-filed SARs with en-
hanced search and reporting capabilities called BSA Direct, to be "fully operational by
October 2005," that the contract to design, develop, implement, web host and provide
support services was awarded to EDS, and that "BSA Direct is designed to support Fin-
CEN's administration of and compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act."); Risk Management
and Regulatory Failures at Riggs Bank and UBS: Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 17 (2004)
(statement of Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency).
65. Banks, Regulators Grapple With SAR Filings, Am. BANKER THE FIN. DAILY, June 8,
2004, at 12. (reporting that examiners are telling bankers that the number of reports they
file-not the quality or usefulness of those reports-is a key factor in assessing compli-
ance). There are approximately 300 examiners onsite at the largest national banks engaged
in continuous supervision of all aspects of their operations; 40 full time employees were
dedicated in 2003 to BSA supervision; three full time BSA compliance specialists are in
the Washington D.C. headquarters office of the OCC dedicated to developing policy,
training, and assisting on complex examinations; and there is a full time fraud expert re-
sponsible for tracking the activities of offihore shell banks and other vehicles used to
defraud banks and the public; supplemented by dozens of attorneys in OCC district of-
fices and the Washington D.C. headquarters who work on compliance matters. In 2003,
the OCC conducted approximately 1,340 BSA examinations of 1,100 institutions and
since 1998, 5,700 BSA examinations of 5,300 institutions have been completed. See
Statement of Daniel P. Stipano, supra note 64, at 6-7 (testifying to the amount of man-
power engaged in supervision of aspects of the operations of the largest national banks,
BSA supervision and compliance, and development of policy and to the approximately
1,340 BSA examinations of 1,100 institutions and since 1998, 5,700 BSA examinations of
5,300 institutions have been completed by the OCC).
66. Banks, Regulators Grapple With SAR Filings, supra note 65, at 12 (quoting specula-
tion that the Washington bank may be acquired):
The issue first surfaced in an article in the April 7 issue of Newsweek which
used information from, and quoted, SARs filed by Fleet National Bank of
Boston. An article in Sunday's issue ofThe Washington Post used information
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likelihood of banks who rightfully do not disclose their SAR policies re-
ceiving negative press, and help criminals to learn to mask their banking
activities in ways which avoid SAR filings. Furthermore, these leaks have
promoted the public perception that there is illegal activity associated
with account holders , thereby increasing the fears of bankers, and possi-
bly chilling future filings.
Almost uniformly, bankers note that if they were privy to the crimi-
nal investigations of these various government agencies, they would be
better able to identify the activity and information that interests law en-
forcement. If banks are unaware of the complexities of terrorist finance
schemes, then their analysis cannot be adequate. Without real guidelines
from the government, the alternatives that bankers will resort to when
deciding how to identify terrorists will likely encourage dangerous tactics
like racial profiling.
Beginning in 1987, the BSA required banks to implement and
67maintain anti-money laundering devices. Under Patriot Act I, anti-
money laundering programs commensurate with the size, location and
activities of a financial institution must be formally maintained. One ad-
ministrative difficulty at the time Patriot Act I was enacted was that its
requirements were extended to a wider range of financial institutions,
such as broker-dealers, casinos, investment companies and organizations
such as check cashing outlets, money service businesses, and Western Un-
ion.68 Thus, CTRs and SARs used to originally thwart money laundering
would not only be used to implement terrorists devices, but would also
have a much larger impact on the country's overall financial transactions.
In addition, if the Secretary of Treasury determines that a financial
institution, an account, or a particular transaction is of "primary money
laundering concern," the Secretary could require the bank to "maintain
additional records or make additional reports in connection with those
transactions; identify the foreign beneficial owners of certain accounts;
identify the customers of foreign banks who use interbank correspondent
accounts and payable-through accounts; and restrict or prohibit the open-
ing or maintaining of these payable-through or correspondent accounts.
'69
While this may all have been well-intentioned by the drafters of Patriot
Act I, they failed to consider how the problem of over-reporting from all
and quotes from more than a dozen SARs filed by Riggs Bank. Neither arti-
cle revealed the source of the reports.
See also Some Fear SAR Leaks Will Lead to Fewer Filings; AM. BANKER THE FIN. DAILY,
Apr. 23, 2004 at 3 ("'Once financial institutions suspect that highly sensitive information
they are filing on a SAR might be publicly disclosed, they may be reticent to be as candid
and forthcoming as they have been in the past.' said Peter Dijinis, a former top official at
FinCEN.").
67. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2006).
68. USA Patriot Act 5 352 (a)-(c) (2001).
69. Id. at 5 311 (codified as amended in 31 U.S.C. 5 5318A(c)(1), § 5318A(b)(2003)).
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the newly required financial institutions on matters of both money-
laundering and terrorism would bog down the current reporting system.
Extending the requirements of the BSA to a larger number of finan-
cial institutions, as well as adapting this legislation to report terrorism, fails
to take into consideration that a significant portion of the sources of ter-
rorists funding has yet to be identified, let alone tracked to the sources
from which it originated. These funds have been determined to come
from such a vast array of diversified and legally operated businesses (from
travel agencies, internet companies, charitable corporations, to small
mom-and-pop grocers and car dealers), in locations both foreign and do-
mestic, that they are next to impossible to track.
Simply, the system that regulates SARs is just too riddled with prob-
lems. Most SARs filed are incomplete, the sheer number of SARs filed is
overwhelming, and the directives of when to file a SAR are too broad.
This overburdens the Treasury Department which ultimately complicates
the government's ability to successfully utilize CTR and SAR obtained
information. FinCEN claims the solution is its Artificial Intelligence or
A170 system. Few in the banking industry believe that.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BANK SECRECY ACT
Those who place civil liberties as more important than the benefits
that might result from government intrusion oppose an increase in the
centralization of Americans' financial information, as long as it exists
without drastic protections against the possible government misuse of that
knowledge. Squarely in the path of that argument is the U.S. Supreme
Court's position that there is no Fourth Amendment expectation of pri-
vacy in a person's bank records when a governmental agency has an
interest in examining those records. 1
70. Al is a complex computer system that provides the ability to process vast
amounts of data, enabling our analysts to explore the sets of links it has established. The
customized programs and algorithms developed by FinCEN's computer scientists allow
the Al's KDD, or Knowledge Discovery Databases, to pull in relevant information from
the universe of CTR. data. The system then connects disparate pieces of information, such
as banking transactions and accounts, and this linking process reveals patterns of financial
transactions that we know are used to launder money or to perpetrate other crimes. Thus
we can find potential suspects during the Al analysis who might have gone unde-
tected.The Al system has linked together common elements from 90 different currency
transaction reports.The system has honed in on these particular CTRs because the activity
reveals a suspicious pattern of cash deposits which simply do not fit the normal profile of a
small grocery store. Treasury, Postal Serv., and Gen. Gov't Appropriations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Sew, and Gen. Gov't of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th
Cong. 113-4 (1997)(statement of Stanley E. Morris, Director, FinCen).
71. See Mille, 425 U.S. at 443.
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The BSA has become the cornerstone of the federal government's
terrorist and anti-money laundering controls.72 The Act requires banks
and financial institutions to monitor and report certain financial transac-
tions to the Secretary of the Treasury.73 It primarily affects the conduct of
banks in the retention of records, 74 recordkeeping and procedures. 7' Gen-
erally, the purpose of the BSA is to ensure that banks-and other financial
institutions regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency,-
provide all relevant information to law enforcement concerning anti-
money laundering and terrorist financing in the form of CTRs and SARs
expeditiously.
The implementation of the BSA "does not constitute an illegal
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment,, 76 neither does
the BSA deprive financial institutions of due process by its recordkeeping
and reporting requirements.7 Yet, the Department of Treasury has used
Patriot Act I and the BSA to pass a plethora of regulations designed to
intercept the financing of terrorist activity and the identification of ter-
rorists.
Since its initial passage in 1970 and the required implementation of
BSA compliance procedures in 1987, bankers have made it clear they do
not like the BSA. Community banks8 especially are overwhelmingly bur-
dened by the demands of BSA reporting. FDIC Vice Chairman John
Reich admits, "The volume and complexity of existing banking regula-
tions, coupled with new laws and regulations, may ultimately threaten the
survival of our community banks .. Even members of the House Fi-
nancial Services Committee continue to question whether BSA reporting
requirements are too rigid, and whether the Treasury Department is really
utilizing the data that is being provided. Regulators again made adjust-
ments in the reporting requirements at the end of 2004. 80 Rep. Scott
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b), 1951-1959 (2003); 31 U.S.C % 5311-5322 (2003).
73. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)( 2) (2003) (defining a "financial institution" as including
banks, depository institutions, casinos, card clubs, money services businesses, broker-dealers
and investment companies).
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (2003).
75. See id. at § 1953.
76. See Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,45-54 (1974).
77. See § 31 C.FR 103.22(b)(1).
78. Community banks are regional financial institutions, typically with assets of
approximately $5 billion or less, which serve and market to a specifically designated seg-
ment of the communities in which they do business, most notably offering highly
community-oriented banking, serving local and regional businesses and the social and
financial needs of their customers.
79. Michelle Hefler, Clash on Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, AM. BANKER THE FIN. SERV.
DAILY, May 13, 2004.
80. BSA REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT (2004), available at
http://wvw.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2004-50.txt; OCC 2004-50, OCC BULLETIN BAN
SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT OF 1970, available at OCC 2004-50; ANN F
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Garrett asked officials from the Treasury Department and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corp., "Is there any consideration to raising the $10,000"
trigger for banks to file a currency transaction report "to a more realistic,
higher number like $20,000 or $30,000?" 8'
BSA requires banks to peer into the financial lives of its customers.
Through personal bank records, personal lives are opened to inspection;
personal political party affiliation, religious affiliations, eating and leisure
habits, cash spending tendencies, personal shopping habits, travel prefer-
ences, music and video delights, perhaps even dating lives or marital
difficulties. We live in a world where, increasingly, personal lives can be
tracked through the financial transactions . But in many ways, we have
been able to limit who accesses this information. These limits have been
impeded under Patriot Act I.
Problems and complaints connected to the filing of SARs continue
to mount. Yet, suspicious activity remains extremely difficult to define. A
simple act of depositing checks in separate envelopes in one transaction,
or making a one-time withdrawal over $5,000, or the deposit of a payroll
check from a company which surfaces on a watch list may trigger a SAR.
When an account is flagged for suspicious activity, the account holder is not
told why, thus leaving no opportunity to offer a justification for the habit or
occurrence which ignited the concern and retrieve one's reputation; a
reputation which becomes increasingly valuable as the account holder
attempts to relocate her account to another financial institution.
Millions of hours of manpower at banks are being diverted at all
levels, from tellers who file the SAks or CTRs, to senior managers who
also have compliance responsibilities. Ideas to expand bank business, meet
customer needs, promote products, and manage personnel all take a back
seat to regulatory compliance in some banks. Not only are labor resources
being lost, but billions of dollars must now be spent on BSA compliance
training, software, hardware, telephone connections to meet the require-
ments of the SAIS3 reporting system, and outside compliance support
JAEDICKE, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN: BANK SECRECY AcT/ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING (2004), http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2004-50.doc
81. See Heller, supra note 79.
82. See Stark v. Connally, 347 F Supp. 1242, 1248, (N.D. Cal. 1972) stating that:
banks have traditionally returned, either directly or through the clearing
house, all checks each month to the original drawer of the checks. It would
seem reasonable therefore, for the drawer of the check to regard himself as
the real owner of his checks, subject only to normal banking processing, and
to expect that detailed information shown only on the face of his checks will
not be automatically broadcast throughout the vast government bureaucracy
without at least some notice, summons, subpoena or warrant in connection
with some legitimate pending inquiry.
83. The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3505 Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial
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such as accountants, attorneys and consultants. On November 10, 2004,
federal regulators published a Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) examination guide
which attempts to reconcile the conflicts between the BSA and Patriot
Act I inherent in SARs. In an OCC Bulletin of that date citing 12 C.FR.
21.11 formally recognized "that the decision to file a SAP, is an inher-
ently subjective judgment.8 4 The Bulletin gave the following guidance: "If
the bank has no reasonable explanation for an unusual transaction after
evaluating the facts, it should be considered suspicious, and the bank
should file an SAR. 5s This may suggest that banks have a duty to explore
the possibility of a "reasonable explanation" for a transaction before filing a
SAR. If this is a sound interpretation of OCC 2004-50, it would go a
long way toward alleviating random discretion of bank employees, and
lessen the likelihood that Muslim and Middle Eastern account holders
would be racially profiled.
In 2004, the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)
was created at the Department of the Treasury. TFI is charged with the
responsibility of the financial war on terror, the integrity of the American
financial system, fighting financial crime, enforcing economic sanctions
against rogue nations and assisting in the hunt for Iraqi assets. 6 The Ex-
ecutive Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, FinCEN, and
the Office of Foreign Assets Control, along with certain reallocated re-
sources from the Treasury Department were all brought under TFI.
Bankers were opposed to the creation of TFI because they see it as only
adding to the confusion.
As recently as June 2004, FinCEN's Director, William J. Fox, hailed
the importance of FinCEN and the BSA as the "financial front of the war
against terrorism." He expressed his belief that "money does not lie. A
good part of the time, financial intelligence is actionable intelligence. It
can be extremely useful for identifying, locating and capturing terrorists
and defining their networks ... and stops the flow of money to terrorists
... which in turn serves to halt or impede terrorists operations. 87 Unfor-
tunately, this is not what has happened. The Bush Administration would
like us to believe Patriot Act I has made a real difference in our efforts to
seize terrorist dollars domestically. After the legislation was signed into law
on October 26, 2001, less than six weeks after 9/11, new reports began to
Services, 109th Cong. 2-7 (2005) (statement of Bradley E. Rock, American Bankers' Asso-
ciation, Chairman, President, CEO of Bank of Smithtown).
84. See JAEDICKE, supra note 80.
85. Id.
86. See Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, Bush Administration Announces Creation
of New Ofice in Ramped Up Effort to Fight the Financial War on Terror (Mar. 8, 2004) (on file
with author).
87. William J. Fox, Director Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Address at
United States House of Representatives: Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
(June 16, 2004).
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recite dollar amounts seized and frozen here and around the world, sug-
gesting Patriot Act I had been the catalyst for America, through our banks,
to win the war against terrorism.
The problem is the BSA is just as ineffective against terrorism as it
was against the war on drugs. Fox agrees, "the implementation of this
risk-based regulatory system is a delicate matter that demands balance,
consistency and clarity. The cornerstone of the Bank Secrecy Act, suspi-
cious activity reporting, requires financial institutions to make judgment
calls." He admits:
If as regulators, we are too aggressive or too passive in super-
vising and examining the financial industries we regulate, there
could be two equally unacceptable outcomes. Compliance
should not be about second guessing individual judgment calls
on whether a particular transaction is suspicious .... If on the
other hand, we are too lax when it comes to ensuring institu-
tions are implementing these programs, proper rep'orting will
not be generated. 9
Since BSA was first passed in 1970, the struggle to weigh an account
holder's right to private bank records against legitimate government en-
forcement needs has been examined by the U.S. Supreme Court in several
cases. Consistently since Shultz 9° , the Supreme Court has held the Bank
Secrecy Act constitutional stating that "the production by a bank of its
records under subpoena is not as to the customer either a Fourth
Amendment illegal search and seizure nor a Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination" 9' However, from Connally, to United States v. Miller, and
finally United States v. Kaatz92 , some major distinctions and vehement dis-
sents occurred in District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, and the Supreme Court. Such a strong diversity of opinions mer-
its a long overdue Supreme Court re-examination of this issue.
Connally made some clear distinctions about when a bank customer
could reasonably expect some privacy concerning the details of his per-
sonal financial affairs. "[T]he District Court created at that time a
requirement of a reasonable relationship between production of the bank
reports and an invasion of a citizens right of privacy amounting to an un-
reasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."'
3
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States and Lewis v.
88. Glenn R. Simpson, US. Says al Qaeda Has Begun to Feel Financial Squeeze, WALL
ST.J., Nov. 15, 2001, at A28.
89. Id.
90. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 21.
91. Connally, 347 F Supp. at 1248 .
92. United States v. Kaatz, 705 E2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1983).
93. See Connally, 347 E Supp. at 1245, 1246.
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United States, the District Court said "what a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
94Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally protected."95
In 1974, the Supreme Court went a step further. In dissenting, Jus-
tice Douglas recognized privacy in bank records:
In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By ex-
amining them, the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers,
creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation,
educational interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so
on ad infinitum ... It is I submit, sheer nonsense to agree with
the Secretary that all bank records of every citizen "have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investiga-
tions or proceedings." That is unadulterated nonsense unless we
are to assume that every citizen is a crook, an assumption I
cannot make.96
Justice Douglas also recognized that "[W]e only rush with the
crowd when we vent on our banks and their customers the devastating
and leveling requirements of the present [Bank Secrecy] Act. I am not yet
ready to agree that America is so possessed with evil that we must level all
constitutional barriers to give our civil authorities the tools to catch
criminals."
97
Of course, this was before we lived in fear, before the terrorist
bombing on the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993; before the
April 19, 1995 car bomb explosion in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Fed-
eral Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma that killed 168 along with 19
children;98 well before the bombing of the United States embassies in Tan-
zania and Kenya, that killed 225 people on August 7, 1998; before the
USS Cole was rammed by a suicide bomber on October 12, 2000 injur-
ing 38 naval soldiers and killing 17;99 before the horrifying loss of 2,992
lives on September 11, 2001; lm and even before the terrorist bombings in
94. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559,563 (1927); Connally 347 F. Supp. at
1247.
95. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,733
(1877); Connally, 347 F Supp. at 1247.
96. See Shultz, 416 U.S. at 85.
97. Id. at 86.
98. CNN Interactive, Oklahoma City Tragedy: The Bombing, available at
http://www.cnn/com/US/9706/171McVeigh.overview.
99. See Howard Schneider & Roberto Suro, Death Toll at 17 in USS Cole Blast; Some
Doubt Yemenis Will Aid in Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2000, at Al.
100. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/casualties of
the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks (stating that as of 2005, 2,992 people were presumed dead as a
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Saudi Arabia and Morocco on May 20, 2003.°1Yet, Douglas perceived the
danger inherent in giving Big Brother his way.102 In Shultz, Douglas re-
marked:
Since Banking transactions of an individual give a fairly accu-
rate account of his religion, ideology, opinions, and interests, a
regulation impounding them and making them automatically
available to all federal investigative agencies is a sledge-hammer
approach to a problem only a delicate scalpel can manage.
Where fundamental personal rights are involved-as is true
when as here the government gets large access to one's beliefs,
ideas, politics, religion, cultural concerns, and the like-the Act
should be narrowly drawn.
1 3
But by 1976, the fact that a bank depositor had no protected Fourth
Amendment interest in domestic bank records maintained pursuant to the
Bank Secrecy Act 1°4 was set in stone. Objections remained rampant, how-
ever, as evidenced by the strong dissents by Justice Brennan and Justice
Marshall in Miller. Justice Brennan's dissent sharply criticizes the majority
squarely on Fourth Amendment grounds. As Brennan pointed out:
it cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank expects that
the documents ... which he transmits to the bank in the
course of his business operations, will remain private, and that
such an expectation is reasonable ... Representatives of several
banks testified at the suppression hearing that information in
their possession regarding a customer's account is deemed by
them to be confidential.0
Brennan continued with remarkable foresight when he exclaimed:
For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals or busi-
ness firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely
volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic
life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank ac-
count. In the course of such dealings, a depositor reveals many
aspects of his personal affairs, opinion, habits and associations.
Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current
biography. While we are concerned in the present case only
result of all four Sept 11 attacks, including casualties at the World Trade Center, the Penta-
gon, on the airplanes, and the hijackers).
101. See Phillip Shenon, US. Raises Terror Alert to Next Highest Level: Orange, N.Y
TIMEs, May 21,2003, at A19.
102. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 85.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 435.
105. Id. at 449.
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with bank statements, the logical extension of the contention
that the bank's ownership of records permits free access to
them by any police officer extends far beyond such statement
to checks, savings, bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees and
all papers which the customer has supplied to the bank to fa-
cilitate the conduct of his financial affairs upon the reasonable
assumption that the information would remain confidential. To
permit a police officer access to these records merely upon his
request, without any judicial control as to relevancy or other
traditional requirements of legal process, and to allow the evi-
dence to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution
against a defendant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited
range of very real abuses of police power.106
Brennan even foresaw the technology and trickery which the intel-
ligence agencies would employ to accomplish the very deeds this dissent
warns against:
Cases are legion that condemn violent searches and invasions
of an individual's right to the privacy of his dwelling. The im-
position upon privacy, although perhaps not so dramatic, may
be equally devastating when other methods are employed. De-
velopment of photocopying machines, electronic computers,
and other sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability
of government to intrude into areas which a person normally
chooses to exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds.0 7
Brennan also warned against allowing access to bank account re-
cords without due process, saying "the potential for abuse is particularly
acute where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access to this informa-
tion without invocation of the judicial process " ' 8 This is exactly what
Patriot Act I allows. Brennan concluded that in fact, there is a "reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bank statements"
' 10 9
Like his fellow justice, Marshall strongly warned against impinging
upon Fourth Amendment protections. Because of his historical tours of
litigation through the South during the 1950s and 60s, perhaps Marshall
even foresaw the possibility of racial profiling. Whatever his motivations,
Justice Marshall's legendary insight was clear in his dissent. Marshall dis-
sents in Miller on the basis that the BSA was "a seizure of bank records
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and unlawful in the ab-
106. Id. at 451.
107. Id. at 451,452.
108. Id. at 453.
109. Id. at 449.
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sence of a warrant and probable cause."" 0 His powerful words resonate
loudly considering our current situation: "I wash my hands of today's ex-
tended redundancy by the Court. Because the recordkeeping
requirements of the Act order the seizure of customers' bank records
without a warrant and probable cause, I believe the Act is unconstitu-
tional."''
By the time Kaatz was decided in 1983 there was no moving the
Supreme Court from the position it had supported in Connally and Miller.
A Fifth Amendment discussion had also entered the scene. Although
Kaatz concerned a CTR as opposed to the production of a check, as in
Connally, the ruling in Kaatz remains applicable."2
Kaatz speaks directly to the question of whether a bank filing a
CTR with the IRS, pursuant to the BSA, is in contravention of a cus-
tomer's Fourth Amendment rights, and whether notice to the account
holder of such a filing is required.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, applying the law in Connally, decided there was neither a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment by the filing of the CTR, nor the failure
of the bank to give notice to Kaatz, its customer, that the CTR was exe-
cuted by the bank and sent to the IRS voluntarily" 3 "The customer had
no legitimate 'expectation of privacy' concerning information contained
in bank records."" 4 Quoting the 1974 Supreme Court decision in Shultz,
the Kaatz court found "the regulations do not require the banks to notify
the customer of the report .... and the banks are left free to adopt what-
ever customer notification procedures they desire" As to the Fifth
Amendment argument Kaatz asserted, the Court replied "the Fifth
Amendment is limited to 'prohibiting the use of physical or moral com-
pulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege. [Morton] was not
forced to buy the certificate of deposit or to use currency in doing so. No
compulsion was exercised on the defendant and no right of privacy ex-
isted within the protection of the Fifth Amendment."""
While the terrorist events of 2001 and the current climate of bank-
ing demand balanced consideration, it is important to note that courts
once found Fourth Amendment rights so much at the core of American
values, that they refused such an encroachment. The District Court for the
Northern District of California understood and articulated this as early as
1972 in Connally:
110. Id. at 455.
111. Id. at 456.
112. Kaatz, 705 F2dat 1241-42.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1242; Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
115. Kaatz, 705 E2d at 1242; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397
(1976).
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The Act [BSA], insofar as it authorizes the Secretary to require
virtually unlimited reporting from banks and their customers
.... as a surveillance device for the alleged purpose of discov-
ering possible, but unspecified, wrongdoing among the
citizenry, transcends the constitutional limits ... as to unrea-
sonably invade the right of privacy protected by The Bill of
Rights, particularly the Fourth Amendment provision protect-
ing the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.16
The entire position of the Supreme Court built upon Connally must
then be re-examined in light of Patriot Act I. There is real inconsistency
where the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit says on
the one hand that Kaatz had no Fourth Amendment right to his account
information while on the other hand, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California made it plain in Connally that the
BSA "insofar as it authorizes reporting from banks as a surveillance de-
vice ... transcends the constitutional limits as laid down by the United
States Supreme Court."1 7 The United States Supreme Court shouldfind a
Fourth Amendment right of privacy in our bank records. Since we re-
quire probable cause in all other private aspects of American life, it would
be unconstitutional not to protect the financial records and activities of
Americans.
This seems especially true considering that financial records have
been proven to be only minimally useful in detecting terrorism. "[T]he
relatively small amounts of money required for terrorist acts can easily
pass unnoticed.""8 Certainly there have been a few instances in which
money wires are connected to questionable Muslim charitable organiza-
tions, even organizations identified as contributing to Al Qaeda causes.
These discoveries have been minute. In most instances, financial records
are being used as a springboard to get into the private information of an
individual's life, even if this initial information is irrelevant to terrorism.
Very few individuals" 9 whose bank accounts have been probed are actu-
ally connected to terrorist activities. Not only must the right to privacy in
financial records be given constitutionally protected status, it is a right that
is easy to administer. Like all other areas of constitutionally protected
American life, if the Court granted bank records Fourth Amendment pro-
tection, all that would be required of government intelligence agencies to
116. Connally, 347 E Supp. at 1251.
117. Id. at 1251.
118. ALFRED B. PRADos & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANcHARD, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS,
SAUDI ARABIA:TERRORIST FINANCING ISSUES 1 (2004)(on file with author).
119. See FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP'T OF THE TREAsuRy, FIN-
CEN's 314(a) FACT SHEET, http://www.fincen.gov/314afactsheet.pdf.
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secure bank account access is probable cause that a crime had or will be
committed.
If there is sound reasoning, there is probable cause, and a warrant is
issued, a probe is authorized, the evidence is allowed, the subversion is
discovered, the terrorist activity is exposed. By this procedure, government
agencies will have no problem finding the relevant evidence. What could
possibly be wrong in continuing the established procedure to overcome
American privacy rights when securing government access to a citizen's
information? Furthermore, if Americans claim not to tolerate indiscrini-
nate bias against any American citizen, then we must uphold that promise
to all Americans, Muslim, Middle Eastern, and "Middle Eastern-looking"
Americans alike.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF EXISTING BANK POLICIES
The problem is not just racial profiling in the criminal justice system.
It's racial profiling in life. 120
Banks have a great deal of discretion within their specific policy
guidelines as to whom they monitor and report to FinCen. The chal-
lenge for banks is to decide responsibly who to monitor. During this
time when the liberties of all Americans are threatened, banks should be
especially vigilant to treat all account holders with similar respect. Can
banks, within the actual guidelines of their operating policies, specifi-
cally target those who "appear Middle Eastern?" On their face, do the
Know-Your-Customer Bank policies allow for this possibility? Do banks
really use racial identity alone to identify someone as a suspicious account
holder? The central question however is: Is targeting or monitoring an
account holder's activity strictly based on that holder's ethnicity or per-
ceived ethnicity an invasion of constitutionally protected privacy rights?
Who is doing the profiling is an important part of the analysis. While we
have a certain set of Constitutional protections from law enforcement we
have no comparable rights given to us from bank employed individuals,
who clumsily identify possible terrorist activity and hence file CTRs or
SARs. In fact, the head of FinCEN has actually said that the decision to
report often comes down to a "hunch. 12' A citizen's privacy rights are
120. Hazel Trice Edney, Candidates Sharply Contrast on Race Issue, DISTRICT CHRON.,
July 22, 2002, at Cover.
121. See Patti Waldmeir, Inside Track- Unaccustomed Warriors-A New Law in the US.
Will Draft Thousands of Businesses Into the Fight Against Terrorism, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at
17.
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demolished by bank employees who are themselves protected from civil
repercussions for their mistakes.' 22
Correct compliance with SAR and CTR requirements dictated by
the Department of Treasury is arguably straightforward, but not extremely
rigid. Most banks issue internal on-line detailed instructions to guide its
employees to correctly comply. Almost every Bank's policy is a keyboard
stroke away from the bank personnel who need more instruction.
A. Have the Bank Policies Created in Response to Patriot Act I
Strengthened National Security?
Appropriate or not, banks are trying to avoid liability from under-
reporting. They are struggling with how to detect fraud, money launder-
ing, and terrorist activity without violating procedural norms. Banks
understand how precarious the balancing act is between protecting ac-
count holder privacy and national security. Although there is no question
that reporting can be an effective tool in the war against terrorism, the
question is, how effective of a deterrent the reporting devices have been
and can be. The truth is CTRs and SARs have limited abilities to detect
criminal behavior, thereby defeating their viability.
Another burden that banks face is the time and expenses associated
with reporting:
123
122. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 550, 106 Stat. 4044
(1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and
42 U.S.C.) (holding banks free from liability for reporting suspicious activity). The safe
harbor in the BSA protects banks from liability for three types of disclosure:
1) A disclosure of any possible violation of law or regulation.
2) A disclosure pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 531 8 (g)(3).
3) A disclosure pursuant to any other authority. See infra.
Pursuant to Lee v. Bankers Trust Co.:
[T]he safe harbor provision applies regardless of whether the SAR is filed as
required by the Act or an excess of caution ... The plain language of the safe
harbor provision describes an unqualified privilege, never mentioning good
faith ... broadly and unambiguously provid[ing] for immunity from any law
(except the federal Constitution) for any statement made in [a] SAR by any-
one connected to a financial institution.
Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F3d 544 (2d Cir. 1999)(emphasis added). See also Stoutt v.
Banco Popular, 320 E3d 26, 31-33 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that immunity is granted to
any financial institution that discloses "any possible violation of law," regardless of whether
the lender had good faith belief); Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F3d 579, 589 (5th Cir.
1999) (stating that "if private businesses were not eligible for immunity from ... claims
arising from assisting undercover federal operations, this would provide a major disincen-
tive to assisting law enforcement and would undermine the needs and interests of the
federal government."); Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 129 E3d 1186, (11th
Cir.1997), aff'd by Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Karam, 306 E Supp. 2d 678 (S.D.Tex. 2004).
123. During the past 25 years, the compliance burden has grown so large and is so
pervasive throughout all levels of bank management that it is extremely difficult to measure.
Research done by the ABA and the Federal Reserve indicates that the total cost of compli-
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The current regulatory environment is having a negative effect
on financial institutions and the economy in general. U.S. fi-
nancial institutions will spend $10.9 billion through 2005 on
AML [Anti-Money Laundering] compliance alone. $695 mil-
lion will be spent on software and hardware, $3.3 billion for
information systems maintenance and the rest of the costs will
be allocated toward employee training, reporting, and other
compliance costs.
124
The financial burdens and constitutional infringements seem to clearly
outweigh the possibility of terrorist detection. And even with these bur-
dens and infringements banks cannot detect every potential terrorist or
dollar being used to fund terrorist activities.
FinCEN publishes reports of success stories2 that include what in-
formation in a particular CTR or SAR led to a positive enforcement
action. Unfortunately, this practice rarely exposes the particular
information in the BSA reporting process which led to the discovery of a
violation. As a result, this fails to give banks any extra guidance about
what information they should be reporting. Furthermore, the reporting
occurs over such an extended period of time that when a "BSA guidance"
story is highlighted by FinCEN it leaves no clear trail as to what informa-
tion the bank(s) reported which proved instrumental to the success of the
operation.12 6 FinCEN however does maintain a "Quick Reference Guide
for Money Service Businesses on Reporting Suspicious Activity" on its
website which points out a "number of possible factors, or 'red flags'
ance today for banks would range from $34 billion to $42 billion per year and this does not
include compliance costs due to legislation such as the USA Patriot Act. For the typical small
bank, about one out of every four dollars of operating expense goes to pay the costs of gov-
ernment regulation. For large banks as a group, total compliance costs run into the billions of
dollars annually. See Statement of Bradley E. Rock, supra note 83, at 4-5.
124. Comment Letter to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and the Office of Thrift Supervision, from Richard M. Whiting, Executive Director and
General Counsel of The Financial Services Roundtable, May 4, 2005 p. 6 (on file with
author).
125. See Law Enforcement Cases Supported by BSA Filing, at http://www.fincen.
gov/lecasesdetail.html.
126. See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep't of the Treasury, Numerous
SARs and CTRs Aid in Hawala Investigation, www.fincen.gov/hawalainvestigation.html
(providing no guidance as to what information was reported by banks or what led the
banks involved to file a SAR, but indicating that the FBI only opened their investigation
and queried the BSA database into the activities of the dealer after receiving a citizen
complaint); Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep't of the Treasury, Decade Long
Investigation from Bank's Filing of Suspicious CTRs Leads to Convictions, http://www.fincen.
gov/suspiciousctrs.html (providing only slightly more direction for banks concerning the
filing of a SAR).
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which signal an activity or transaction that might be suspicious."' 12 7 The
reference guide suggests that bank employees ask themselves questions
such as "[i]s the amount of the transaction unusually large for the typical
customer or for the money service business? Does the customer make
similar transactions more frequently than normal? Does the transaction
seem unusual for the customer?"The guide gives examples such as:
customer uses fake ID, two or more customers use similar IDs,
customer changes a transaction after learning that he or she
must show ID, two or more customers seem to be working to-
gether to change the transaction to evade BSA by structuring,
breaking up transactions, using two or more bank or money
service locations on the same day.
12
The guide continues, "if a customer offers a bribe or admits to a crime
the law requires you to file a SAR if it involves or aggregates funds or
other assets of $2,000 or more."' 29 Clearly, the decision to report or not to
report is governed by selection standards determined entirely by law en-
forcement.
Bankers argue validly that whether a bank follows the FinCEN
Guide or it gleans from other available data what should be reported as
suspicious, there is no inerrable system of distinguishing terrorists from
the benign account holder. This makes the possibility that an innocent
account holder would be subject to an illegal search and seizure, and
highlights the reasons for strengthening the protections against such an
illegality. The Supreme Court should establish the Fourth Amendment
right to privacy in every American bank account. As long as this precursor
to monitor a bank account or transaction exists, the bank or the intelli-
gence agency using the SAR or CTR is able to justify its intervention
into the privacy of every American citizen, irrespective of what the initial
catalyst was for the bank's or government's intrusion.
B. Constitutional Consequences of the Homeland Security Act
The Homeland Security Act establishes a central agency that ac-
cesses, receives, and analyzes intelligence information, law enforcement
information, and any other information from federal, state and local agen-
cies, even from the private sector, in an attempt to promote security in
America.' 30 Critical infrastructure information (sought voluntarily from
the private sector) is used in conjunction with known government intel-




130. See USA Patriot Act § 201.
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ligence to implement protected systems analysis, a national warning sys-
tem, interdependency studies, recovery and reconstitution methods. As
long as information is submitted to Homeland Security in good faith, it
will not be disclosed or used in any civil action arising under state or fed-
eral law. 13 However, all information Homeland Security receives is not
submitted in good faith.
The public is largely unaware of Homeland Security action until
they, are or one of their business relationships, are affected. Blacklisting
and Brownlisting are no longer only foreign policy or political tools, they
are being used as justifications to conduct acts of criminal secret civil
rights infringement.
The primary objection to the Homeland Security Act is that it is yet
another governmental agency with access to both law enforcement data
and the private information of Americans. Additionally, the Act synthe-
sizes information gathered from the private sector to evaluate the level of
security risk an individual poses, irrespective of the trust-worthiness of
that information. Neighbors, co-workers, and anyone one associates with
who offers information to this agency , whether that information be truth
or fabrication, can be combined with legally or illegally obtained infor-
mation by the government to determine whether that individual
constitutes a security risk. This poses an obvious danger for Muslim citi-
zens or citizens of Middle Eastern descent.The consequences of these lists
have created many problems, only one of which is financial discrimina-
tion. Under this Act, informing, investigation and final finger-pointing are
all done in secret. The byproducts are account closures, halted wire trans-
fers, and even credit withdrawal for Americans. Any American is fair game,
but increasingly the civil rights of Saudi-, Arab-, Iraqi-, and Muslim-
Americans have suffered.
V.THE PROBLEM LEGISLATION
THE USA PATRIOT ACT: THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER II, 2001
Legislative interpretation of the 342-page Patriot Act I created quite
a bit of chaos in the financial industry. The Senate sent the Patriot Act
directly to the floor without debate or opportunity for analysis on the
132350 different subject matters and forty agencies it would impact. The
Act was passed less than six weeks after the initial proposal by the Finan-
cial Action Task Force and the September 11 attack on the World Trade
131. See id. at 55 212-14.
132. See generally, id. at 5§ 1-1016; Editorial, Infringing on Civil Liberties, ST. PEERS-
BURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at 1OA (approved by a margin of 356 to 66 by the House of
Representatives and 98 to 1 by the Senate); J.M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism; Anti-Terror
Laws in Place; Feds Urgently Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 27, 2001, at 5.
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Center. Any conflicts which arose were settled through private conversa-
tions between the Justice Department and party leaders. "The Bush
administration implied that members who voted against it would be
blamed for any further attacks -a powerful threat at a time when the na-
tion was expecting a second attack to come any moment and when
reports of new anthrax letters were appearing daily.' 33 It becomes simple
to see the "triangle of fear"'3 4 used to influence the Senate and the Ameri-
can people that Patriot Act I would be a sound response to the perhaps
tenuous need 'to monitor the flow of cash through our nation's banks, lest
some of that cash be channeled into fuel for terrorist activities.
Many suspect Patriot Act I of being developed in the shadows of the
government long before the 9/11 terrorist attack. While the Act passed
with overwhelming support, there were multifarious concerns echoing in
the halls of Congress about how to control the potential loss of privacy
and the feared abuses of power. Even now, the Congressional intent of
many of the provisions and compliance requirements remain unclear. Pa-
triot Act I has not been entirely well received by any group outside of law
enforcement. Human rights, civil rights, policy review, and city councils
across the nation all object to the expansiveness of the Act. On May 29,
2003, Philadelphia, the fifth largest city and birthplace of the U.S. Consti-
tution and the Declaration of Independence, became the 117 state or
local government to approve measures opposing the Patriot Act as a threat
to the Constitutional rights of citizens. The resolution, passed by the City
Council, called for members of Congress to work for the repeal of the
federal legislation which granted the Justice Department broad new po-
lice powers.
135
As established, financial institutions are protected from privacy law-
suits under Patriot Act I and the Annunzio-Wyle Anti-Money Laundering
Act.Yet no one knows the extent to which Patriot Act I has infringed on
the Constitutional rights and protections pursuant to the Fourth Amend-
ment.
The aggressiveness of the Patriot Act I creates several important
Constitutional issues for banks and bank employees:
Fourth Amendment-Patriot Act I increases government surveillance
powers by allowing warrantless searches of account holders' lives, activities
133. American Civil Liberties Union, Surveillance Under the USA Patriot Act,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17326res20030403.htm.
134. CHRISTOPHER SCHEER ET AL., THE FrVE BIGGEST LIES BUSH TOLD US ABOuT IRAQ
37 (2003) (explaining the term "triangle of fear" as referring to the linking [ofl Iraq's
megalomaniacal dictator, Saddam Hussein, to both a vast arsenal of weapons of mass de-
struction he was alleged to possess and to the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, believed to
be behind the 9/11 massacre).




and habits memorialized in bank records in violation of the Fourth
Amendment requirement to show probable cause.
Fourth and First Amendment-The Fourth Amendment is also af-
fected by the increased searches of "foreign intelligence information" and
"trap and trace" searches using computers to deduce the origin and/or
destination of communications, wires, etc. This has various negative effects
on banking relationships with foreign banks. It also violates the First
Amendment by permitting an investigation solely based on an individual's
exercise of his right to freedom of association.
Fifth and First Amendment-In direct violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process clause, Patriot Act I allows government invasion into
private bank records, without notice to the affected individuals, thereby
circumventing RFPA. Bank employees receiving search orders or generat-
ing reports required by the BSA, are restricted by Patriot Act I from
disclosing the existence of that order or report to the account holder or
anyone outside the proper government agency. This could also violate the
constitutional right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment if
a bank employee is prohibited from disclosing that they have been served
with a search order, regardless of whether there is a need for concealment.
For the first time, under Patriot Act I, a wider segment of the finan-
cial industry was responsible for reporting under the Act, due to the
redefinition of "financial institution." Institutions such as brokerage
houses, money service businesses, casinos, and real estate companies be-
came responsible for first drafting and then complying with an anti-
money laundering and terrorist identification scheme. Clearly, uncovering
and preventing access to terrorist financing is of grave importance. How-
ever we know little about this (as evidenced by the five pages devoted to
discussion of funding for the 9/11 attack by the National Commission on
136Terrorist Attacks in its official report), and are able to control less, the
manner in which Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are funded.
136. The 9/11 Commission estimates between $400,000 and $500,000 was spent to
plan and conduct the attack. According to the CIA, it was al Qaeda-funded with "about
$30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised
almost entirely through donations." The money was moved, stored and spent in ordinary
ways easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place. The origin of the funds remains
unknown. Bin Laden inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, kept his
assets in Sudan and received about $1 million per year from this fortune. Bin Laden drew
on ties to wealthy Saudi individuals, relied on a core group of financiers who raised
money from donors in primarily Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, gathered Taliban finan-
cial support when he was in Afghanistan, collected money from employees of corrupt
charities, and the al Wafa organization may have funneled money to al Qaeda who had
access to al Wafa bank accounts. Al Qaeda has been alleged to have used a variety of ille-
gitimate means, particularly drug trafficking and conflict diamonds, to finance itself.
Ultimately, the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money
used for the 9/11 attacks. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE U.S., THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 169-172 (2004) (finding that al Qaeda has been alleged to
have used a variety of illegitimate means, particularly drug trafficking, to finance itself.
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There has been some due diligence in identifying the source of funds
for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The plaintiffs in Burnett v. Al Baraka Invest-
ment brought suit against all "persons and entities that funded and
supported the international terrorist organization known as Al Qaeda,
which ... carried out the attacks" '137 identifying Al Rajhi
as the largest retail bank in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiffs central alle-
gation against Al Rajhi is that [the banks] have acted as
instruments of terror, in raising, facilitating and transferring
money to terrorist organizations. [The allegation also is that]
Al Rajhi is the primary bank for a number of charities that
138serve as al Qaeda front groups ....
The same problem arises when dealing with American banks, in that
there is no obvious direct link from American banks to terrorist organiza-
tions like Al Qaeda. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia responded to Plaintiffs' allegation by saying that:
[t]he act of providing material support to terrorists, or 'funnel-
ing' money through banks for terrorists is unlawful and
actionable-but again-Al Rajhi is alleged only to be the fun-
nel. Plaintiffs offer no support, and we have found none, for
the proposition that a bank is liable for injuries done with
money that passes through its hands in the form of deposits,
withdrawals, check clearing services, or any other routine
banking service.
139
Although it seems reasonable to hold banks liable for actively shield-
ing terrorist funds, they must not use racial profiling as a means to identify
potential terrorists and reduce their responsibility to conduct adequate
research.
While Patriot Act I gives government agencies and banks enhanced
investigative techniques to pinpoint terrorist targets, it heightens the ob-
vious pitfalls of racial profiling. Although it has been partially responsible
for capturing $34 million dollars 140 linked to terrorism, and while it also
Ultimately the U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money
used for the 9/11 attacks). See also Douglas Farah, US. Saudi Anti- Terror Operation Planned;
Task Force Will Target Funding, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2003, at A1 (reporting that intelligence
experts say that funding from wealthy individuals on the Arabian Peninsula, principally
Saudi Arabia, to al Qaeda still amounts to millions of dollars a year); SCHEER ET AL., supra
note 134, at 39.
137. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. and Dev. Corp., 274 F Supp. 2d 86,91 (D.D.C. 2003).
138. Id. at 109.
139. Id.
140. The Financial War on Terrorisn: New Money Trails Present Fresh Challenges, Hearing




has the potential to serve as a deterrent, its effects since its initial inception
has been marginal. The governmental agencies using these enhanced sur-
veillance methods must constitutionally justify the Act's effectiveness to
Congress, the American people, and courts, the tenets of our justice sys-
tem. Our Constitution demands this. 41
VI. BUILDING ON FLAWS: THE PROPOSED DOMESTIC SECURITY
ENHANCEMENT AcT-PATRIOT ACT II
"The Fourth Amendment creates "zones of privacy" which protect
against governmental invasions of the ... privacies of life ....
Increasingly the term "racial profiling" has arisen in the forum of
public debate in reference to government activity directed at individuals
because of their race. There is no denying the events of September 11
caused law enforcement to focus upon Muslims, foreign nationals of
Middle Eastern descent, and those who "appear to be of Middle Eastern
descent." However, not only is discrimination in America against the law
and our sense of fairness, it undermines the melting pot ideal on which
America was founded. Our national principles and the U.S. Constitution
require a conscious determination of whether using profiling based on
race in this context and any success in apprehending terrorists using these
methods merits a continuation of the suspension of Fourth Amendment
and First Amendment principles. Certainly, federal officials must create
tools to combat terror carried out by terrorists. However, that cannot be
accomplished by abolishing the building blocks of democracy. Like Patriot
Act I, Patriot Act II as drafted by the staff of Attorney General John
Ashcroft143 accelerates the serious erosion of Constitutional rights.
Several specific provisions of Patriot Act 114 have drawn significant
objections:
Under Sections 102-109, 120-122 and 124: Concerning wiretaps
and Surveillance, there would be no limits on what police could examine
in the areas of religious and political activity. Credit records and library
records become freely available without a judicially justified warrant, and
any organization identified as involved in any form of civil disobedience
141. U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV
142. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1885)).
143. Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Justice Department Drafts Sweeping Expansion of
Anti-Terrorism Act, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Feb. 7, 2003, http://www.
publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=94.
144. American Civil Liberties Union, Interested Persons Memo: Section-by-Section Analysis
ofJustice Department draft "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003" also known as "Patriot Act
II," Feb. 14, 2003, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17203leg20030214.htm.
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would be open to wiretapping. Wiretaps under Patriot Act II can be ac-
complished without a court order for 15 days after any terrorist attack.
Sections 125-129 These sections propose "national security letters"
which resemble administrative subpoenas that intelligence and other gov-
ernment agencies can use to obtain and utilize information in national
security investigations. These sections significantly strengthen the gov-
ernment's access to travel records, financial records, and all types of
consumer reports, including consumer credit reports. They also authorize
the Justice Department to eavesdrop on or conduct furtive searches of any
suspected terrorist or foreign agent for 15 days after a military conflict or
a declaration of war.
No objection to spying on the "type" of people we are eager to clas-
sify as terrorists? The problem is, these Sections can focus the
government's intrusiveness onto American citizens. The ability of the gov-
ernment to initiate wiretaps on U.S. citizens for a greater length of time
and with less court involvement is enhanced if terrorism is made the sub-
ject of investigation. Surveillance of an American citizen suspected of
spying for a foreign power is allowed, even when the activity alleged to be
"suspicious" conduct is not in fact criminal. An even more dangerous
problem is that under these sections, the Attorney General would no
longer have to personally authorize the use of certain intelligence evi-
dence in criminal cases, he could simply delegate this responsibility.
Under Section 501: "Expatriation of Terrorists," an American sup-
porter who becomes a member of, or provides material support to, a
group engaged in civil disobedience could lose his citizenship. A citizen
normally has to denounce his citizenship; however, under this section his
intent can be inferred from conduct.
Patriot Act II undermines the very essence of our criminal justice
system by allowing these actions at all, but it is especially troublesome
when these activities are conducted secretly. Proposed Patriot Act II by-
passes Congress by permitting foreign initiated searches and wiretaps
without the requisite treaty permission. Patriot Act II would eliminate
our federal checks and balances by destroying the constitutional limits
imposed on wiretaps, access to confidential records, police power searches
and surveillance, and government spying on religious and political expres-
sion. Surely it is obvious that while Patriot Act II purports to establish
more power to subdue terrorists, it actually empowers our government to
use these tools on American citizens who have no connection with ter-
rorist activities. The ACLU points to RICO and suggests that when the:
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was en-
acted by Congress, Congress intended those extraordinary
powers to be used against the Mafia and organized crime. Over
the years, however, RICO was used far more broadly, even
against anti-abortion protestors and other dissidents. The sug-
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gestion is that some of the powers the government may be
seeking in Patriot Act II, while ostensibly directed at terrorists,
could likewise be used in unexpected ways."'
Patriot Act II means more government intrusion, more constitu-
tional infringement, more threats to American citizenship, and less
safeguards on federal intelligence and law enforcement. Enacting this leg-
islation would magnify the egregious mistakes made in Patriot Act I.
CONCLUSION :THE BALANCING ACT
"They that can give up essential liberties to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. ,,146
Does Patriot Act I allow banks to identify terrorists, and hence
strengthen national security, without compromising the constitutionally
protected privacy of account holders?
The Patriot Act is unprecedented in its amendment to provi-
sions that had previously checked the ability of the
government to observe everyday activities and obtain personal
information about citizens. The fact that it does so in such a
potentially oppressive manner has not quite hit consciousness
of the American people. Privacy in the sense of freedom from
government intrusion, is a necessary foundation for the free
exercise of democracy. 147
Patriot Act I, and proposed Patriot Act II, are dangerous legislative
tools that are too vague and unproven to prevent terrorism. We must not
be asked to give up our Constitutional right to privacy in a desperate at-
tempt to sniff out the terrorists who pass in and out of our banking
system. As the "American death toll in Iraq reaches 1,594, and the
wounded exceed 10,000,,148 we must consider what the lives of our sons
and daughters, mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers mean. Americans
like to say our troops are dying for freedom, but does that include free-
dom in our banking lives? It seems that how Americans spend their
145. American Civil Liberties Union, How "Patriot 2" Would Further Erode the Basic
Checks on Government Power That Keep America Safe and Free, Mar. 20, 2003,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/173461eg20030320.html (quoting Scheidler v. Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003)).
146. THE ELECTRac BEN FRANKLIN, http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/quotable/
quote04.htm.
147. See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with Privacy
Under the USA PATRIOTAct, 80 DENV. U. L. REv. 375,378-79 (2002).
148. Charley Reese, Two Years Out, LEWROCKWELL, May 9, 2005, http://www.
lewrockwell.com/reese/192.html.
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money and who has access to this information, is at the root of that free-
dom.
Patriot Act I was an emotional lapse of judgment on the part of the
Senators who, save but one,149 voted to pass it. Members of both the
House and the Senate had concerns about the potential intelligence abuse
of power by government intelligence and the resulting loss of privacy for
Americans.5 Before USA Patriot Act was even conceived, our govern-
ment intelligence agencies were covertly doing all Patriot Act I purports
to do. Patriot Act II is beyond the powers any citizen of common intelli-
gence would believe necessary to combat terrorism.
Under Patriot Act I, identifying potential terrorists has become dan-
gerously close to racial profiling. We already have rogue police officers,
who use any excuse, racial profiling included, to haul Black and Brown
people over to the side of the road, search their cars, arrest and fingerprint
them. Patriot Act I allows him, while the victim is in the station posting
bail, to secure a warrant and search the victim's home based on what he
may find in a person of color's vehicle. So what is to stop the rogue
officer from securing your DNA using proposed Patriot Act II, Section
301-606, wiretapping your telephone, and hijacking your bank account
records? Certainly not Patriot Act I and II. As a young girl preparing for
the National Spelling Bee, I thought I had to learn words like antidisest-
ablishmentarianism. Who would have known I would live to see a climate
in America where government agencies wish for such a state. Americans
are being forced by this legislation to compromise our Fourth Amend-
ment rights. In return, the government has found few money trails in
American banks that expose terrorists. Thus Americans have gained little,
in return for giving up much.
At the policy level, banks have written SAR, CTR and "Know-
Your-Customer" policies that reasonably disallow for discrimination.
While there is some language in the bank policies which raises concerns,
for the most part it is unintended, perhaps even the product of poor tech-
nical writing. Unfortunately, the language in the policies permit bank
employees' discretion. Remember, these are the people who see and in-
teract with "the customer," and therefore this is the level where
discrimination is most likely to occur.
During an in-person transaction, the possibility for discrimination
remains, on the basis of a Middle Eastern surname, or using visual ethnic
identity. It must be clear to those who deal with banks account holders
149. Democrat Russell Feingold of Wisconsin was the only senator who voted
against the USA Patriot Act in 2001. Only 66 representatives voted against the USA Pa-
triot Act (implying that only Feingold was concerned about government abuse and
privacy loss, although others felt pressured to vote for it).
150. Robert E. Pierre, Wisconsin Senator Emerges as a Maverick: Feingold, Mio Did Not
Back Anti-Terrorism Bill, Says He Just Votes His Conscience, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2001, at A8.
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that characteristics like ethnic identity are not valid, and that behavior is
the key to identify a terrorist.
The people charged with implementing Patriot Act I in banks are
human and human judgments are often weak and inherently flawed. The
problem for banks and other financial institutions will always be the ten-
dency of employees to rush to judgment in applying the policies. Given
this weakness, the most effective way to detect terrorists' money in banks
is via the legislation itself. Patriot Act I, its ineffectiveness, its implications
on the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of our Constitution, and its
safe harbor provision which protects bank personnel from their overt or
covert discrimination, is the real source of discrimination.
Patriot Act II is a step that only magnifies this outrage, and one
which must not be taken. The war on terrorism makes racial profiling
seem legitimate, even necessary. But, it does not take much imagination to
see what continuing Patriot Act I beyond 2006 or implementing Patriot
Act II would do.
Already, a bipartisan group of Representatives and Senators are pro-
posing the "End Racial Profiling Act. 1" This legislation contains a
number of methods to both identify when profiling occurs and create
provisions that attempt to stop this racial, ethnic, religious and national
origin profiling. Almost half of the states have passed similar legislation.
ERPA is designed to pick up where the 2003 Department of Justice's
guidelines prohibiting racial profiling ended. It creates a long overdue
cause of action for victims of racial profiling. Aside from Johnny Coch-
ran's success in the New Jersey racial profiling cases,15 2 victims of racial
profiling have never found much justice in the courts. ERPA requires a
national uniform data collection system to promote police accountability.
One of the proposed measures allows funds to be withheld by the attor-
ney general from police departments which continue behavior that
resembles racial profiling or refuse to comply with the directives of
ERPA. So that there can be no valid excuse not to comply, ERPA pro-
vides grants to assist police agencies to collect the necessary racial
profiling data. Already, over 100 members of Congress and many public
advocacy groups-including progressive law enforcement organizations-
have joined to co-sponsor the Act.
5 3
The U.S. Department of Justice has also responded to profiling in
the context of law enforcement in November of 2000 by creating A
151. End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, H.R. 3847, 108th Cong. (2004); End Racial
Profiling Act of 2004, S.2132, 108th Cong. (2004) (sponsored by Reps. John Conyers, D-
MI and Christopher Shays, R-CT in the House of Representatives and introduced in the
Senate by Senator Russ Feingold, D-WI, with support of 128 members of the House and
16 members of the Senate for ERPA).
152. SeeJOHNNIE COCHRN,A LAWYER'S LIFE 209-30 (2002).
153. End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, H.R. 3847, 108th Cong. (2004); End Racial
Profiling Act of 2004, S.2132, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems.' s4 Racism is a
disease we must be committed to defeat. Profiling has not enhanced na-
tional security; not a single arrest, not a single dollar found by a SAR or
CTR report since the aftermath of 9/11, has been traced to a terrorist act.
Moreover, the Treasury Department is now so overwhelmed by the sheer
number of SARs and CTRs, if there were evidence of terrorism uncov-
ered by these devices, it would be months before the particular SAR
would be identified.
A. Proposals for Solution
Instead of taking more Constitutional liberties of the American
people, the unbridled issues which arise under Patriot Act I and now Pa-
triot Act II, should be addressed. Here are several proposed directives:
Rather than debate the merits of The Patriot Act, Congress must
examine whether it has secured results. Not a single terrorist has been
discovered by using the dual CTR and SAP, reporting devices. It was en-
tirely unreasonable to reenact portions of Patriot Act I when it became
due for examination in 2005. As an alternative to re-enactment, Patriot
Act I should be limited in its application to terrorists or only the people
on the various government intelligence agency watch lists. If Patriot Act I
is limited to veritable instances of terrorism there will be minimal objec-
tion to its advocacy of increased surveillance ability (including everything
from wiretapping, pen registers, trap and trace and record keeping to
monitoring physical movements, financial institution reporting, search
span) by the expanded roles of the CIA, FBI, DOJ, and the Treasury De-
partment.
As the 9/11 Commission has advocated,"'5 appoint one neutral leader
over terrorism as head of the National Counter Terrorism Center, whose
154. RAMiRnz E-r AL., supra note 2, at iii (urging more jurisdictions to determine
whether discriminatory policing existed in the area through voluntary data collection
efforts. This guide was prepared by Northeastern University with funding from the U.S.
Department ofJustice after President Clinton and U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, civil
rights leaders, police and government leaders convened in Washington D.C. at the confer-
ence Strengthening Police-Community Relationships June 8-9,1999, and provides an overview
of the nature of racial profiling; a description of data collection and its purpose; current
activities in California, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Great Britain; and recommenda-
tions for the future).
155. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 136, at 403,405. Stating:
We recommend the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), built on the foundation of the existing Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC). Breaking the older mold of national government organiza-
tion, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint
intelligence, staffed by personnel for the various agencies ... The head of the
NCTC should be appointed by the president, And should be equivalent in
rank to a deputy head of a cabinet department ... report[ing] to the national
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priority is to direct a concerted effort among all the government intelli-
gence agencies. 116
These goals were partially accomplished in March 2004 when the
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence was created. However, the
9/11 Commission cites six problems that indicate a continued need to
restructure the intelligence community. National intelligence, the Com-
mission complains, is still organized around the agencies, creating
structural barriers to a performing joint intelligence work.1 7 The intelli-
gence community should have the ability to pool [at all times]
information gathered abroad with information gathered domestically, us-
ing a common method of collection, processing, reporting, sharing and
analyzing. 15 Another suggestion would be to find a more efficient way to
examine and analyze the data collected in SARs and CTRs, so relevant
information could be used in a timely manner to protect Americans. The
United States government has spent over $300 billion dollars5 9 on fighting
terrorism since 2001, and, by the government's own estimates, has recov-
ered only $61.5 million dollars through the use of the BSA created
SAR 6 reporting device.
intelligence director, an office whose creation [the Commission also recom-
mends], placed in the Executive Office of the President ... [thereby]
indirectly [reporting] to the President.
156. Few realize how vast the United States intelligence community is. Currently
there is an Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, which included the Office of the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, the Community
Management Staff, the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, the National Intelligence
Council, and other community offices. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which
performs human source collection, all-source analysis, and advanced science and technol-
ogy. The National Intelligence Agencies: National Security Agency (NSA), which
performs signals collection and analysis, National Geospatial-Inteligence Agency (NGA),
which performs imagery collection and analysis, the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), which develops, acquires, and launches space systems for intelligence collection,
and other national reconnaissance programs. Departmental intelligence agencies [consists
of]: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the Department of Defense, Intelligence entities
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of
the Department of State, Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence of the Department
of Treasury, Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence
Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, Office of
Intelligence of the Department of Energy, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infra-
structure Protection (IAIP) and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence of the
Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 407-408.
157. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 136, at 408.
158. Id. at 409
159. House Passes Iraq Spending Bill, Assoc. PREss, May 5, 2005, available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/politics/main692881 .shtml?CMP=ILC-
SearchStories.
160. See Julie Wakefield, Following the Money, GovT ExEcuTivE MAG., Oct. 1, 2000,
available at http://www.govexec.com/features/1000/1000s5.html (finding that the FBI
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Al 161 is not working. Each and every Comment letter received by
FinCEN, and many other governmental agencies and committees, from
members of the banking community, bank executives, and industry ana-
lysts begs the government to clearly define the requirements to file a SAP
or CTR. Other alternatives would be to eliminate the identity verifica-
tion requirements or at least reduce them, reduce the requirements to
notify the financial institutions Board of Directors and committees of the
Board, reduce the filing requirements or at least the CTR reporting
threshold, more clearly define the "structuring" reporting perimeters, or
give additional guidance on filing SARs concerning continuing activity
of a similar nature by the same customer. The repeated cry is to reduce or
eliminate redundant, inefficient, and unnecessary aspects of the regulatory
compliance burden.This inefficiency and its associated cost is passed on in
increased fees to bank customers, and perhaps even reduced pay for bank
employees.
More importantly, the discretion to file or not to file a SAR or
CTR must not be any longer only left in the hands of tellers. Despite the
probable increase in labor hours of those more qualified to make these
decisions, this proposal would allow bank tellers to continue making ini-
tial reports. These reports would then be relayed to an internal central
clearing house in each bank- monitored by bank personnel astute and
educated in the BSA-and would only be allowed to continue on to the
SARS system if, after full and fair analysis, the possibility of terrorism or
money laundering is clearly identified. In addition, the Department of the
Treasury simply must act to promulgate less burdensome and more spe-
cific SAR and CTR filing rules for banks to follow.
To work further towards a solution, Americans should concern
themselves with securing United States Supreme Court review of the
Constitutionality of the Patriot Act's effect on rights like the Fourth
Amendment. Shall we as a country abandon or reaffirm the First and
Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution? For 200 years, the Su-
preme Court has been the protector of our legal rights, and must now
create a right for Americans to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures in their bank accounts. Beginning with Connally, the Court has
taken a wrong turn on the Fourth Amendment issue. Justice Douglas'
criticism of the reporting provisions of the BSA makes the point that:
[t]hese omnibus grants of power allow the Executive Branch
to make the law as it chooses in violation of the teachings ...
that lawmaking is a congressional, not an Executive function
... The Fourth Amendment warrant requirements may be re-
moved by constitutional amendment but they certainly cannot
uses SARs in 98 percent of its bank fraud cases and has recovered $61.5 million dollars in
defrauded monies with the reports).
161. See supra note 70.
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be replaced by the Secretary of the Treasury's finding that cer-
tain information will be highly useful in "criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings.'
162
A search and seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unrea-
sonable, subject to "'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions.' 6 3 "One's
bank accounts are within the 'expectations of privacy' category ... How-
ever, the historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is
that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to
obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy
and protected speech.'
'164
The End Racial Profiling Act must be enacted. Yes, for the Act's
various articulated reasons, but also for one of its most vital canons-to
establish a cause of action for victims of intelligence gathering abuses.
Civil litigation and criminal actions concerning racial profiling incidents
have been notoriously difficult to prosecute. If there are no effective
checks and balances, Constitutional infringements on American citizens
remain unbridled and abuses of power continue unabated, leaving victims
of racial profiling with even less protection.
The U.S. House of Representatives is moving forward along a path
parallel to ERPA. The first federal profiling legislation passed the House
and is awaiting Senate approval. And then of course, there remains the
question of whether President Bush will veto the entire bill. The Con-
gressional Black Caucus endorsed the Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users, sponsored by Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, as part
of a $275 billion transportation bill which provides $60 million over six
years requiring states to develop proactive anti-profiling measures and
document racial statistics on traffic stops. Holmes has characterized the
bill as a back-door attempt, as opposed to the front-door anti-police
mandatory civil rights profiling law that Representative John Conyers has
been trying to get through for the last two sessions of Congress. 16 Clearly
something must be done. Racial profiling is a civil rights issue that will
not disappear without the proper attention. For too long this issue has
plagued African Americans; and now Muslims, Arab Americans, Middle
Easterners, and even those who "look Middle Eastern" are being sub-
jected to equally poor and unfair treatment. Too many victims of profiling
have died on the nation's highways or been refused redress in the courts
for the ill-advised behavior of police officers. We cannot stand by as racial
profiling continues to be projected into the terrorism melee. America
maintains it is a nation governed by constitutional pro-action. If that is
162. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 90-91
163. Id. at 89.
164. Id.
165. End Racial Profiling Act, H.R. 3847, 108th. Cong. (2004); Transportation Eq-
uity Act: A Legacy for Users, H.R. 3550, 108th Cong. (2003).
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true, the rights of all Americans must be protected. H.R.3550 is a sound
first step on the journey to constitutional equality.
Cries of the Office of Homeland Security seem to now legitimize
group based profiling, contravening constitutional rights and individual
dignity. Fighting the "War on Terror" and safeguarding our financial sys-
166
tems is estimated to cost taxpayers $250.9 million for fiscal year 2005.
In 2005, there were close to twelve million filings of CTRs and SARs,
167
an overwhelming majority of which contain information largely irrele-
vant to combat terrorism and will likely not be examined by treasury
officials for months after they are filed. The very creation of Patriot Act I
and the impending Patriot Act II contribute to the enormous pallor and
wickedness of racial profiling throughout our country, and in banks. All of
this a response to what the 9/11 report says was approximately $400,000
to $500,000 in terrorist dollars which did not really pass through our
banks.
1 6
The body of federal legislation passed in response to infringements
on American rights to privacy in their bank accounts, is a radical indica-
tion of how important this issue is to all facets of American ethnicity.
Considering how important this is, the Supreme Court should at the very
least re-hear this matter and re-examine the need to extend Fourth
Amendment protection to financial matters. We cannot and must not sort
the contents of the American melting pot while dramatically undermin-
ing the melting-pot ideal, as we have historically done to African
Americans. Being an American means enjoying the rights of an American.
166. The Budget Overview for the Department of the Treasury: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Transportation, Treasury, and General Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement ofJohn SnowTreasury Secretary of the United States), available at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/record.cfm?id=220599.
167. Statement of Stanley E. Morris, supra note 70, at 114 (testifying that depository
institutions filed 297,753 SARs prior to October 28, 2004, and projecting that number to
double in 2005). See also Government Appropriations for 1998, Testimony of Stanley E.
Morris, Director Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Tuesday March 4, 1997, p. 114 .
Morris testified that 11 million CTRs are filed each year.
168. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 136, at 169-72.
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